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ASK ABOUT CONDUCT, NOT MENTAL ILLNESS: A
PROPOSAL FOR BAR EXAMINERS AND MEDICAL
BOARDS TO COMPLY WITH THE ADA AND
CONSTITUTION
Phyllis Coleman*
Ronald A. Shellow**
I. INTRODUCTION
In deciding issues of character and fitness to practice, professional licensing
boards, including state bar examiners, ask applicants about history of or treatment for
mental illness and substance abuse. Rather than identifying applicants who might injure
future clients or patients, however, these questions merely perpetuate prejudice against
the mentally ill.
Courts acknowledge the questions implicate an applicant's right to privacy. Nev-
ertheless, these same courts consistently rebuff constitutional challenges to the ques-
tions, citing the compelling state interest in protecting the public from incompetent
practitioners. These judges are right-but they are also wrong. The underlying hypoth-
esis of these questions is that absence of treatment for or history of mental illness or
substance abuse somehow correlates with character and fitness to perform as a compe-
tent professional. New medical research suggests this hypothesis is an outdated myth.
Protecting the public is undoubtedly a compelling state interest. But recent scien-
tific studies demonstrate inquiries about illness and addiction do not elicit meaningful
knowledge regarding competence. Therefore, because these questions fail to achieve
their ostensible goal of protecting the public, no state interest exists to justify invading
the applicant's privacy.
New medical research reveals the startling information that almost half the peo-
ple treated by a mental health professional for emotional problems do not have a diag-
nosable mental illness. When this new data is combined with the fact that many people
who suffer from a recognized psychiatric condition never consult a mental health pro-
fessional, the conclusion seems unavoidable. Even if there were some causal relation
between mental illness and competence to practice-and the burden of proving this
nexus rests on professional licensing boards--current questions target the wrong people
for heightened scrutiny. Under the present system, the number of individuals, if any,
who might be identified as likely to later pose problems for clients or patients is too
small to justify the injury to all applicants.
Extent of injury does vary depending on the applicant's situation. But, because of
the intrusive nature of the inquiries all applicants are damaged.' Applicants who must
* Phyllis Coleman, J.D., Professor of Law, Shepard Broad Law Center, Nova Southeastern Uni-
versity.
** Ronald A. Shellow, M.D., F.A.C.P., F.A.P.A., Clinical Professor of Psychiatry, University of
Miami.
1. This position is consistent with the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. See infra notes
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respond affirmatively face additional injury. Many applicants who disclose a history of
illness or treatment are injured because their admission is delayed.2 Further, even
those applicants who are admitted timely are harmed in at least two ways: 1) being
compelled to reveal private details of mental health or substance abuse and 2) facing
the stigma associated with a mental disorder.
This article briefly discusses the role of boards and their virtually unlimited
authority to determine and apply criteria for granting licenses. It reviews questions
concerning mental health and substance abuse typically used as part of the evaluation
process for state licensing of lawyers and physicians.3
This article describes new medical research which can be used to underscore
problems with current questions. Representative cases challenging these inquiries as
unconstitutional invasions of privacy are analyzed. Because courts generally use a
balancing test-privacy rights of the applicant against the compelling need to protect
potential clients and patients-to reject privacy arguments, this article suggests how
new data about mental illness should prompt a reweighing of the interests. The new
evidence tilts the balance in favor of an applicant's privacy rights and supports abol-
ishing these intrusive questions. However, even if courts continue to reject privacy
arguments, the questions must be eliminated for another reason-they violate the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA").
This article explains relevant portions of the ADA and analyzes a few ADA
cases and legislative history4 to illustrate how and why the Act prohibits these ques-
tions. Injury results under the Act from merely asking the questions thereby identifying
persons suffering from a disability such as mental illness. Finally, this article proposes
questions about specific behavior which will provide needed information without un-
necessarily infringing upon an applicant's privacy rights or violating the ADA.
Presence of or treatment for mental illness or substance abuse are not directly
related to character and fitness. Instead, the test is conduct: whether the applicant's
98-101 and accompanying text.
2. Deborah L. Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional Credential, 94 YALE L.J. 491 (1985).
In this comprehensive article, Professor Rhode suggests that the present system is "simply perverse" to
the extent that these inquiries deter treatment. Id. at 581.
Professor Rhode highlights several flaws in the current approach. First, she points out the para-
dox inherent in the bar's position: punishing applicants who recognize a need for help and seek treat-
ment "is unlikely to yield greater mental health among the practicing bar." Id. at 582. Second, even
where problems are most likely to affect a person's practice, forecasts "rarely will be conclusive" in
individual cases. Id. Because of difficulty in prediction, she argues that these questions are "equally
open to dispute." Id. She finds "irony, if not hypocrisy," in denying an applicant a license based on
"contentiousness" when the profession "generally rewards it." Id.
Finally, she says the bar's approach to confidentiality is "anomalous." When the issue is lawyer-
client privilege, attorneys "have consistently maintained that compelled disclosures will chill the kind of
candid interchange necessary for informed assistance. Yet the profession is entirely comfortable requir-
ing applicants with histories of psychological treatment to waive the privilege for therapeutic communi-
cation . . . a policy . . . scarcely conducive to fostering the candor and trust on which effective thera-
peutic relationships depend." Id. (citations omitted).
3. Letters were sent requesting applications to boards of bar examiners and medical boards in
every state. Applications were received from thirty-two boards of bar examiners and thirty-seven boards
of medicine. See infra note 44 and accompanying text.
4. Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988).
Although appellate courts have not specifically held Rehabilitation Act cases are persuasive
authority under the ADA, "that conclusion would appear both logical and reasonable." Andrew L.
Symons, A Three-Step Test for Determining When Compliance with the Americans With Disabilities Act
is Required, 28 GONZAGA L. REV. 235, 239 (1992/93).
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behavior is likely to injure his patients or clients, the profession or the public. The
most accurate way to predict whether a person's conduct is likely to cause injury is to
determine if he has a history of harmful behavior.' Consequently, professional licens-
ing boards should inquire about conduct, not treatment for or history of mental illness
or substance abuse.
Licensing Boards
More than a century ago, the Supreme Court made it clear that the obligation to
protect the public welfare permits states to regulate professions by licensing those who
may practice.' Later, in Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners,7 the Court concluded
that a state may "require high standards of qualification, such as good moral character
or proficiency in its law." 8 The state's authority is "not unfettered,"9 but great defer-
ence is given to the criteria licensing boards establish." "Most commentators agree
that occupational licensing has been carried too far and that its adverse effects on
individual liberty ... outweigh its benefits.""
Another problem for most professional licensing boards stems from potential
conflict inherent in their composition. In fact, more than twenty years ago, Justice
Black cautioned about this dilemma when he dissented in an attorney licensing case. 2
Justice Black acknowledged the importance of ensuring applicants and bar members be
of good character. 3 But, he also recognized the value to the applicant of his right to
5. See, e.g., State of Wisconsin v. Daniel J. Sepulveda, 350 N.W.2d 96, 103 (Wis. 1984). In this
case, a psychiatrist testified that because "the best predictor of future behavior is past behavior, there
is an increased chance that this individual's future behavior would be similar to his past behavior." Id.
(quoting Dr. James Richard Thiel and Steven M. Garrett, Note, Criminal Law: People v. Murtishaw:
Applying the Frye Test to Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness in Capital Cases, 70 CAL. L. REV.
1069, 1083 (1982)).
6. See generally Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889). The Court upheld a West Virginia
statute establishing criteria for a license to practice medicine.
7. 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
8. Id. at 239.
The good moral character requirement was developed to safeguard the legal rights of clients.
Michael Fritz, Comment, Constitutional Law-Attorney & Client: Denial of Admission to the Bar Be-
cause of Past Conduct and Present Moral Character, Layon v. North Dakota State Bar Board, 458
N.W.2d 502 (N.D. 1990), 68 No. DAK. L. REv. 969 (1992). The bar's interest in preserving the pro-
fession and its good societal image is another, more subtle reason for the standard. According to bar
spokespeople, this goal "can be achieved by 'eliminating the diseased dogs before they inflict the first
bite."' Id. at 970 (quoting Donald T. Weckstein, Recent Developments in the Character and Fitness
Qualifications for the Practice of Law: The Law School Role; The Political Dissident, BAR ExAM.,
Aug. 1971, at 23).
9. Toni M. Massaro & Thomas L. O'Brien, Constitutional Limitations on State-Imposed Continu-
ing Competency Requirements for Licensed Professionals, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 253, 266 (1983)
[hereinafter Licensed Professionals].
10. Broad deference "is especially unreasonable in the occupational licensing area, where the selec-
tion measures that are protected from meaningful scrutiny are essential prerequisites to professional
employment." Id. at 271-72.
11. J.R.R., II, Note, Due Process Limitations on Occupational Licensing, 59 VA. L. REv. 1097,
1129 (1973). The student author argues that there needs to be effective review of this "virtually un-
checked" power. Id. at 1097. Judicial review "is a necessary component of due process." Id. at 1128.
But the need for judicial review of licensing board actions is particularly critical. "And because licens-
ing boards are of necessity tinged with the appearance of bias, a willingness by courts to review board
decisions can go a long way toward restoring both the image and the actuality of fairness." Id. at
1128-29. The time has come for courts to honestly confront the invasive, discriminatory nature of
questions concerning mental health and substance abuse. See infra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
12. Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154 (1971).
13. Id. at 174 (Black, J., dissenting). Courts consistently ignore another important argument. Treat-
Journal of Legislation [Vol. 20:147
practice, "often more valuable to him than his home, however expensive that home
may be."' 4 This means before a State may deny or revoke a license, it "must proceed
according to the most exacting demands of due process of law."'5 Justice Black ex-
pressed concern that this important right was "left to the mercies of his [the
applicant's] prospective or present competitors." He argued that when the State de-
prives a person of the right to practice, the individual should enjoy the same
protections as when he is deprived of any other property. "[Allmost anyone would be
stunned" if a person were deprived of his home because of his political beliefs or
loyalty to the government, but states deny licenses to practice for exactly those rea-
sons.
16
A similar argument can be made if denial"1 is based on an applicant's history of
ment of applicants is very different from those who are already licensed. Preferential treatment for the
licensed professional creates serious inconsistencies. For example, the usual disciplinary action in the
1970s for failure to file a tax return was a public reprimand. However, at that very same time, an
applicant was denied admission because he did not file a return with the Internal Revenue Service.
R.J. Gerber, Moral Character: Inquiries Without Character, 57 B. EXAMINER 13, 19 (May 1988) (the
author provides additional, equally troubling, illustrations).
But see Frasher v. West Virginia Board of Bar Examiners, 408 S.E.2d 675 (W.Va. 1991). De-
ciding that applicants are not similarly situated with attorneys who are already admitted, the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia rejected an equal protection challenge based on disparate treatment.
Id. at 679-80. Because of the differences between the groups, "a higher standard of good moral char-
acter may be applied so long as there is 'a rational connection with the applicant's fitness or capacity
to practice law."' Id. at 680 (quoting Schware, 353 U.S. at 239).
Some move toward periodic recertification of physicians has begun. Alfred Gellhorn, Periodic
Physician Recredentialing, 265 JAMA 752 (1991). "Federal legislation has been introduced requiring
physician recertification, 19 of 23 specialty boards are requiring periodic recertification, and it has been
proposed that reimbursement for physician services be contingent on compliance with standards of
medical care." Id.
Ironically, imposing a disclosure requirement on professionals might actually prompt elimination
of the inquiries for everyone. However, because most practicing lawyers and physicians are not subject
to periodic review regarding their mental health, asking applicants about their illnesses is even more
offensive.
The Federation of State Medical Boards recognizes the need for review. In fact, as early as
1976, the Federation suggested licensed physicians be "systematically assessed at appropriate intervals
to identify those whose qualifications and/or fitness for continued licensure are open to reasonable
question." Position statement of The Federation of State Medical Boards of the United States on the
assessment of licensed physicians, N.Y. STATE J. MED. 226 (Apr. 1989).
The Federation's proposed question regarding a licensee's illnesses is appropriate:
h. Whether the licensee has had any physical injury or disease or mental illness within
the registration period which could reasonably be expected to affect his or her practice
of medicine.
Id. at 226-27.
But, the proposed question about substance abuse is troubling, reflecting the Federations's appar-
ent erroneous belief that history of or treatment for substance abuse necessarily impairs ability to prac-
tice forever:
g. Whether the licensee has ever been addicted to or treated for addiction to alcohol or
any chemical substance.
Id. at 226.
14. 401 U.S. at 174 (Black, J., dissenting).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. The fact that "few applicants, if any, have been denied admission on mental health grounds,"
Rosalind Resnick, Groups Criticize Bar On Mental Histories, NAT'L L.J., May 18, 1992, at 1, 3, is
not sufficient to justify these questions for at least two reasons. First, if the information obtained from
these intrusive inquiries does not exclude applicants, what purpose are the questions intended to serve?
Second, the ADA and regulations go further than simply preventing denial of equal treatment to indi-
viduals with disabilities. The Act also prohibits policies which unnecessarily impose additional require-
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or treatment for mental illness or substance abuse. "[A]lmost anyone would be
stunned" if an individual were deprived of his home because of his illness. Decisions
to deny are particularly troubling because applicants are at the "mercies" of prospec-
tive competitors.
Justice Frankfurter, concurring in Schware, highlighted the role of the profession
in determining fitness." However, the majority focused on the requirements rather
than who made the decision. The Court concluded that board-established criteria are
valid so long as they have "a rational connection with the applicant's fitness or capaci-
ty to practice law."' 9 This standard of review is "easily satisfied,"'2  but limits exist.
States "cannot exclude an applicant when there is no basis for their finding that he
fails to meet these standards, or when their action is invidiously discriminatory.""'
Nevertheless, this rational connection standard dooms "nearly all" substantive due
process challenges to failure.22 Equal protection challenges also lose, even when the
"regulation has had a consistent and significant adverse impact on a suspect class."
23
Because lawyers and physicians enjoy a position of trust' vis-a-vis clients or
patients and the public,' licensing boards may require applicants to establish their
ments on individuals with disabilities, and unneeded inquiries about disabilities. 28 C.F.R. §
35.130(b)(8) (1993) (interpretative guidance).
18. 353 U.S. at 248 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
19. Id. at 239.
20. Licensed Professionals, supra note 9, at 269.
21. 353 U.S. at 239.
22. Licensed Professionals, supra note 9, at 269. In a footnote, the authors acknowledge the "few
exceptions in which courts have held otherwise either involve the application of a legitimate require-
ment, such as good moral character, to discriminate against a specific group of individuals, or impli-
cate other constitutional rights . I..." id  at 269 n.34.
23. Id. Although these disparate impact cases involve race discrimination, they are relevant be-
cause the ADA treats disabled persons as a suspect class. See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
Because of this precedent, the ADA is even more important. The Act and legislative history clearly
establish intent to expand protection for persons with disabilities.
24. The state interest in regulating doctors is "especially great" because the physician is in a
"position of public trust and responsibility." Boedy v. Department of Professional Regulation, 463 So.
2d 215, 217 (Fla. 1985). Although the qualified physician enjoys a "valuable property right which
must be protected," that right is not absolute. Regulation is permitted under the police power. When
the rights of the physician and the state conflict, the rights of the doctor "must yield to the power of
the state to prescribe reasonable rules and regulations which will protect the people from incompetent
and unfit practitioners." Id.
The Department of Professional Regulation (DPR) attempted to take disciplinary action against
the physician asserting he "suffered from a mental or emotional illness." Id. at 215-16. The court
affirmed an order for psychiatric examinations to obtain "reports and expert opinion and testimony
concerning [petitioner's] ability to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety," the standard
established by statute. Id. at 216 (quoting from the DPR order). The doctor's claim that his fifth
amendment privilege prohibited the board-ordered examinations was rejected because disciplinary pro-
ceedings are not penal in nature. Id. at 216-17.
25. "The necessity of good moral character originates in the peculiar fiduciary nature of the prac-
tice of law." See R.J. Gerber, supra note 13,' at 15. In this thought-provoking article, Rudolph J.
Gerber-Associate Presiding Judge of the Superior Court in Phoenix, Afizona---argued that entry re-
strictions "still remain largely ineffective in identifying those likely to engage in misconduct." Id. at
14-15. Conceding the underlying hypothesis that "to be a good lawyer one must be a morally good
person," Judge Gerber exposed the obvious flaw in the argument: absence of any definition of "a
morally good person." Id. In fact, courts recognize "no litmus test" to determine good moral character
exists. See, e.g., Application of Allan S., 387 A.2d 271, 275 (Md. 1978).
Some courts do attempt to define attributes of good moral character. See, e.g., In re Manville,
494 A.2d 1289 (D.C. 1985) ("respect for the rights of others and for the law, . . . fairness ...
trustworthiness and reliability, . . . and a professional commitment to the judicial process and the
administration of justice.") Id. at 1298.
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good moral character26 and fitness to practice.17 The character and fitness require-
ments are appropriate. The problem is that using current questions to define these in-
quiries improperly confuses legitimate questions of character and fitness with illness.
The mere presence of mental illness or substance abuse no more impacts on an
individual's character than the existence of coronary artery disease or cancer.
Certainly, an applicant or professional may be denied a license or disciplined if
his behavior is a product of mental illness.2 Mental disorders or substance abuse are
sometimes also raised in disciplinary actions to mitigate' sanctions for misconduct."
Mr. Manville engaged in a continuous pattern of criminal and antisocial conduct for a period of
two years, culminating in a homicide while in the commission of a burglary. He pled guilty to vol-
untary manslaughter. After his parole ended, Mr. Manville attended law school. He graduated and
passed the bar examination. He applied for admission to the District of Columbia Bar. But following a
committee hearing, he was denied admission. Because of his record of past behavior, the court deter-
mined the usual ex parte procedure was insufficient. Instead, without denigrating testimony of his reha-
bilitation or credibility of his witnesses, the court decided an independent investigation of his moral
character was necessary.
26. Using mental or emotional instability to determine fitness to practice is the "most nebulous
basis" for deciding moral character. Michael K. McChrystal, A Structural Analysis of the Good Moral
Character Requirement for Bar Admission, 60 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 67, 96 (1984). Professor
McChrystal explains that most reported cases actually concern persons who "exhibit abnormal behavior,
whether or not victims of mental illness." Id. at 97. The issue is "a particularly sensitive one, especial-
ly since not all forms and degrees of emotional instability are rationally connected with fitness or
capacity for law practice." Id. at 99. Professor McChrystal states the "imprecision" of standards for
judging mental or emotional instability make these decisions even "more delicate." Id. at 100. Conse-
quently, he concludes, bar authorities "may feel more comfortable . . . focusing on the symptoms of
mental or emotional instability rather than on the degree of instability itself." Id. Presumably, the
"symptoms of mental or emotional instability" to which he refers are the applicant's behavior.
27. 401 U.S. at 159.
28. See, e.g., In the Matter of Hoover, 779 P.2d 1268, 1271 (Ariz. 1989). The attorney, who suf-
fered from "bipolar manic depressive psychosis, . . . misappropriated substantial sums from his client
and fraudulently billed for personal expenses." Id. at 1269-70. Psychiatrists agreed the atiomey's con-
duct was a "product" of his psychosis. But clients were injured by the attorney's misconduct, not his
illness. Thus, disciplinary action for that conduct was appropriate. Although the court did permit con-
sideration of the M'Naghten test of insanity in mitigation, judges rejected the notion that mental illness
is a per se bar to disciplinary action for ethical violations. Id. at 1270-72.
When necessary to protect the public, sanctions in addition to license suspension may be im-
posed. For example, a physician's bipolar mental disorder manifested in a psychotic episode and bi-
zarre behavior which jeopardized his patients. As a result, the Iowa State Board of Medical Examiners
suspended his license indefinitely. State Takes [sic] Suspends Psychiatrist's License, UPI, Aug. 7, 1990,
available in LEXIS. News Library, UPI file. Subsequently, the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services excluded him from participation in Medicare and federally funded state health care programs.
The decision was based on risk of recurrence of his illness and possible injury to his patients. Dr.
Narinder Saini's request to apply the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to modify his exclusion because of
his disability was denied. In re Application of Saini, 588 N.Y.S.2d 563 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992).
In disciplinary actions, some courts do recognize an attorney's behavior is the issue. See, e.g.,
Matter of Carmany, 466 N.E.2d 16 (Ind. 1984). The court referred to the attorney's diagnosed mental
condition as: "manic depression in the manic stage, active psychosis, schizophrenia and possible para-
noia." Id. at 23. The court acknowledged mental illness or alcoholism may be considered in mitigation.
Nevertheless, the court's obligation is to "safeguard the public from unfit attorneys, whatever the cause
of unfitness." Id. Consequently, the court balanced the attorney's "unfortunate circumstances" against
its:
duty to maintain a competent Bar and protect the public from further unethical conduct.
Respondent's specific acts of misconduct, taking his client's funds under the most bizarre
circumstances, without any authority and in flagrant violation of the rules, and his engag-
ing in deception and misrepresentation strike at the very core of the attorney's basic
obligation to his client, trust.
Id.
29. Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Mental or Emotional Disturbance as Defense to or Mitigation
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But, in all cases, the real issue is conduct, not illness.3
of Charges Against Attorney in Disciplinary Proceeding, 26 A.L.R.4th 995 (1983).
30. Even in cases where sanctions are reduced, however, the public is protected, contrary to argu-
ments of people like Thomas A. Pobjecky, General Counsel to the Florida Board of Bar Examiners.
Thomas A. Pobjecky, Mental Health Inquiries: To Ask, or Not to Ask-That Is the Question, 61 B.
EXAMtNER 31, 35 (Aug. 1992).
For example, as a result of his alcoholism, an attorney neglected clients, causing them injury.
The Florida Bar v. Larkin, 420 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1982). Following the disciplinary proceeding, the
referee recommended a three year suspension. The Supreme Court of Florida acknowledged "a practic-
ing attorney who is an alcoholic can be a substantial danger to the public and the judicial system as
a whole." Id. at 1081. The justices also explained that the "responsibility to assure that the public is
fully protected from attorney misconduct" rests with the court. Id. Nevertheless, the court recognized
"(i]f alcoholism is dealt with properly, not only will an attorney's clients and the public be protected,
but the attorney may be able to be restored as a fully contributing member of the legal profession."
Id. The court held that it was proper to consider if the attorney was willing to seek rehabilitation
when determining the appropriate discipline.
Based on this philosophy, the justices approved the referee's recommendation that the attorney
be found guilty of three counts of professional misconduct, but modified the sanction. The attorney
was suspended for "ninety-one days and until such time as respondent establishes rehabilitation." Id.
This solution furthers the interest of all parties. Clients and the public are protected because until the
attorney can prove he is rehabilitated, he cannot practice. The impaired attorney is punished for his
misconduct, but the penalty may be reduced because the misconduct was a product of his disease. The
possibility of a lesser sanction provides incentive to seek rehabilitation. Id.
Additionally, rather than mitigating the sanction if misconduct is caused by mental illness, it
may actually increase the punishment. In re Peek, 565 A.2d 627 (D.C. 1989). The attorney violated
several disciplinary rules by neglecting to pursue his client's lawsuit and lying about the status of the
case. In defense, the attorney claimed "'extreme depression and a personal decline' had 'impaired his
ability to conduct his law practice."' Id. at 629 (quoting response to bar counsel). The court agreed
that "absent consideration of respondent's emotional condition," a four month suspension would be
appropriate. Id. at 632. The court imposed a four-month suspension-the final two months stayed-if
the attorney satisfied conditions of a two year probation, including supervision and weekly counseling.
Id. at 634.
The court conceded the validity of the concern "that a lengthy period of probation in addition
to, or even in lieu of, a shorter period of suspension may amount to a greater, not a lesser, sanction."
Id. at 633. Nevertheless, "[a]bsent objection, we cannot conclude [an attorney] will be aggrieved by a
long probationary term that affords an obvious advantage: the continuation or early resumption of a
law practice that otherwise would be suspended." Id. at 634.
i Further, an attorney may not use alcoholism, drug use, or mental illness as a mitigating factor
in a disciplinary proceeding unless he can demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his
condition "substantially affected" his misconduct. In re Temple, 596 A.2d 585, 590 (D.C. 1991). This
means the lawyer "must show that the factor was sufficiently determinative of his conduct that its
removal can be expected to end the misconduct." Id.
Moreover, despite sympathy for attorneys whose misconduct is a product of mental disorders,
courts refuse to mitigate where the misconduct involves serious moral turpitude. See, e.g., In re Lamb,
776 P.2d 765 (Cal. 1989). The attorney took the bar exam for her husband. She argued her "troubled
background led her to value family life and marital harmony at all costs." Id. at 766. After her hus-
band failed bar exams in Texas and California, he "reacted with violent rage and depression." Id.
Further stress was placed on their marriage when her pregnancy and general health were threatened by
"serious complications of her chronic diabetes." Id.
After she pled nolo contendere to two felony counts of false personation, she divorced her
husband and was evaluated and treated briefly by a psychiatrist. Id. Because of "the magnitude of
petitioner's misconduct, and its pertinence to her fitness as an attorney, proof of her complete and
sustained recovery and rehabilitation must be exceptionally strong . . . .Though replete with testimoni-
als to her talent and general character, . . . no 'clear and convincing' indication of petitioner's sus-
tained and complete rehabilitation from chronic personal problems which led to her catastrophic mis-
judgment" was proven. Id. at 768-69 (emphasis in original).
Finally, a lawyer's mental condition may be considered in mitigation, and "to demonstrate his
capacity for rehabilitation and fitness to practice law, but it may not be used as a complete barrier to
a legal practitioner's amenability to immediate sanctions for professional misconduct." Oklahoma Bar
Association v. Colston, 777 P.2d 920, 925-26 (Okla. 1989) (emphasis in original).
31. One particularly egregious case is illustrative. Matter of Ronwin, 667 P.2d 1281 (Ariz. 1983).
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Illness does not effect a professional's fitness to practice unless his disease caus-
es conduct harmful to clients or patients. Therefore, inquiries about illness are ineffec-
tive and inappropriate. Instead, questions about character should focus on behavior
which demonstrates whether the applicant is honest32 and ethical.33 Inquiries con-
cerning fitness should probe whether the applicant can competently perform the tasks
of his profession.'
For example, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals concluded requirements
for an attorney include honesty, plus "respect for the rights of others and for the law,
trustworthiness, reliability, and commitment to judicial process and the administration
of justice."35 None of these are necessarily adversely affected by mental disease' or
Applicant was denied admission because he failed to establish his mental fitness to practice. Experts
concluded his "compulsive personality disorder manifested itself in overzealousness in the pursuit of
what Ronwin considered to be justice and was marked by paranoid attitudes, lack of flexibility, hyper-
sensitivity, inability to compromise, perfectionism, obsessive preoccupation with details, suspiciousness
and hostility." Id. at 1285.
The court correctly recognized:
The question is whether these behavioral traits and the emotional problems which cause
them are sufficient in magnitude and duration that they may be expected to affect the
applicant's conduct as a lawyer and, to a significant degree, cause it to fall below ac-
ceptable standards. The issue thus is not merely capacity and capability, but also behav-
ior.
Id.
32. John Moore, Executive Director of the Florida Board of Bar Examiners, claims that these
questions are necessary to identify people who lie on applications. John Murawski, Fitness vs. Stereo-
type: Can Bar Examiners Seek Psychiatric Records, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 13, 1992, at 1. Lying is con-
duct which impairs a person's ability to function as a lawyer, but better ways exist to discover liars
than these intrusive, personal questions which fail to specifically target integrity. People who are dis-
honest will probably lie about other facts.
A 1992 attorney-discipline case provides an example. In re Application of Sandier, 588 N.E.2d
779 (Ohio 1992). Stephen Sandier was admitted to practice law in early November 1989. Within a
couple of weeks, Sandier disclosed to the Ohio Supreme Court a list of criminal offenses he had
failed to disclose. Spurred by this indication of deceit, the board investigated further. Additional serious
untrue statements were uncovered, including a false denial of treatment for mental illness.
Certainly, boards should not license dishonest professionals. But evidence of his false statement
concerning treatment for mental illness was not even instrumental in alerting the board to this
applicant's dishonesty. As occurred in the Sandler case, applicants who lie about some things will
likely lie about other matters as well. Thus, deceptive answers concerning past treatment for illness
were merely cumulative and unnecessary to establish lack of integrity.
Further, these questions may be traps for the misinformed. Some students simply do not under-
stand the need to reveal any treatment for mental illness or substance abuse. Others fail to disclose
because of bad advice. For example, in an article about counseling law students, the author-a clinical
psychologist-says "[a] few students questioned the implications for their bar applications or for em-
ployment, but they were usually reassured when they learned that services were confidential and could
not be reported to professional authorities." Faith Dickerson, Psychological Counseling for Law Stu-
dents: One Law School's Experience, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 82, 89-90 (1987). The fact that such inaccu-
rate, potentially damaging advice could be published in the Journal of Legal Education suggests that
the reason some students fail to disclose this information is not to deceive; instead, they are following
advice of a counselor or other person they trust.
33. "The relationship between a lawyer and a client calls for the exercise of the highest degree of
integrity and fidelity." State ex. rel. Oklahoma Bar Assoc. v. Colston, 777 P.2d 920, 925 (Okla. 1989).
34. But see Stephen K. Huber, Admission to the Practice of Law in Texas: A Critique of Current
Standards and Procedures, 17 Hous. L. REv. 687 (1980). Professor Huber also argues fitness and
character are separate standards, but he claims fitness includes "present mental and emotional health of
an applicant as it affects competence to practice law, while good moral character involves an evalua-
tion of the character traits of an applicant, particularly honesty and trustworthiness." Id. at 691-92.
35. In re Baker, 579 A.2d 676, 683 (D.C. 1990) (quoting In re Manville, 494 A.2d 1289, 1298
(D.C. 1985)).
36. In fact, it has been suggested that the presence of certain mental disorders could have a posi-
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substance abuse, and certainly not by treatment for these disorders.
Recognizing general questions about treatment or counseling for mental illness
have "rarely, if ever, brought to light a serious fitness question that was not highlight-
ed by other information,""a the District of Columbia recently modified its bar applica-
tion.a" Questions about mental illness were eliminated, and inquiries regarding hospi-
talization and substance abuse were limited to the past five years.39 Although this
compromise moves the result in the right direction, it misses the real solution. Because
the issue is behavior, information about character and fitness can better be gleaned
from more focused, less intrusive questions about conduct.
II. QUESTIONS
Professional licensing boards ask questions about mental illness and substance
abuse to determine which applicants are fit to practice.' However, these questions4 '
tive correlation with success in practice. For example, an applicant to the D.C. bar had been "an ex-
tremely successful, and apparently exceptionally able" litigator in another jurisdiction, despite a long
history of treatment for "a condition which involved exaggerated feelings of grandiosity, among other
things." Charles L. Reischel, The Constitution, the Disability Act, and Questions About Alcoholism,
Addiction, and Mental Health, 61 B. EXAMINER 10, 24 n.26 (Aug. 1992). Mr. Reischel serves as a
member and counsel to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals Committee on Admissions.
37. Id. at 11.
38. These changes were a response to action by the Mental Health Law Project. John Murawski,
Bar Applications to Drop Questions on Mental Health, LEGAL TIMES, March 9, 1992, at 15. "It's an
excellent first step, and it will protect the rights of the vast majority of bar applicants," according to
Leonard Rubenstein, Executive Director of the project. Id.
39. See Charles Reischel, supra note 36, at 10. Unfortunately, not all jurisdictions are this enlight-
ened. In Florida, for example, the general counsel to the Board of Bar Examiners, Thomas Pobjecky,
rejects the applicability of the ADA. Thomas A. Pobjecky, Mental Health Inquiries: To Ask or Not to
Ask-That Is the Question, 61 B. EXAMINER 31 (Aug. 1992). Mr. Pobjecky apparently fails to under-
stand the Act. He attacks the decision because D.C. eliminated questions about mental illness but re-
tained limited inquiries about substance abuse. "If the ADA were to mandate the removal of mental
health inquiries on a bar application, then questions regarding alcohol and drug treatment should also
be barred." Id. at 34.
Mr. Pobjecky's conclusion is puzzling. The ADA explicitly denies protection to those who are
currently using illegal drugs. 42 U.S.C. § 12114(a). Further, the ADA permits drug testing, even prior
to employment, by specifically excluding these tests from other medical examinations. 42 U.S.C. §
12114(d)(1).
Mr. Pobjecky's lack of understanding is not limited to the ADA. He also confuses mental ill-
ness with "ability to practice law in an ethical and competent fashion." Id. at 35. Mental illness is not
a character flaw-it is a disease.
40. Advocates claim present questions are "intentionally broad in scope to eliminate subjective
decision making by bar applicants" about what they must disclose. Thomas Pobjecky, supra note 39,
at 32. Proposed inquiries about behavior which request specific examples of impairment are more con-
crete, and thus diminish "subjective decision making."
Questions about mental illness and substance abuse are also raised in disciplinary actions. See,
e.g., Danny R. Veilleux, Annotation, Misconduct Involving Intoxication as Ground for Disciplinary
Action Against Attorney, 1 A.L.R.5th 874 (1992); Robert A. Brazener, Annotation, Validity and Appli-
cation of Regulation Requiring Suspension or Disbarment of Attorney Because of Mental or Emotional
Illness, 50 A.L.R.3d 1259 (1973).
41. One expert, who says his perspective is that of a philosopher concerned with ethics in the
professions, denies the validity of these questions. Frederick A. Elliston, Character and Fitness Tests:
An Ethical Perspective, 51 B. EXAMINER 8 (Aug. 1982). Mr. Elliston is a Senior Research Associate
at the Center for the Study of Ethics in the Professions at the Illinois Institute of Technology and
author of several publications on professional ethics. He argues that troubling moral issues underlying
assessment of an applicant's mental health justify abandoning the inquiry.
Elliston suggests information concerning an applicant's emotional stability is only available from
three sources: 1) a professional counselor; 2) the applicant; or 3) someone else who is aware of the
applicant's situation. Id. at 12-13. When the "serious moral hurdles" to using any of these sources is
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fail to elicit information about competence.42
Thirty-seven medical boards responded to requests for application forms. The
following table reviews the classes of questions on these medical board applications:
General subjects of questions Frequency
Legal problems connected with substance abuse 24
Addicted to or used drugs or alcohol 27
Treated for substance abuse 20
Physical or emotional problem 22
Treatment for mental illness 20
Medication 2
Communicable disease 2
Thirty-two boards of bar examiners responded to requests for application forms.
The following table reviews the classes of questions on these bar applications:
General subjects of questions Frequency
Legal problems connected with substance abuse 6
Addicted to or used drugs or alcohol 23
Treated for substance abuse 24
Physical or emotional problem 5
Treatment for mental illness 26
Medication I
Communicable disease 0
viewed in light of the absence of data, establishing "the mental health of prospective lawyers is a
serious problem," Elliston says the questions should be eliminated. Id. at 14.
Elliston objects to asking professional counselors because compelling disclosure violates their
ethical codes, making it "morally unjustifiable and wrong." Id. at 13. In fact, because the lawyers'
own code of ethics requires confidentiality, attorneys cannot seek the information "without violating a
basic moral principle of their own profession." Id. Elliston contends that "fi]t is wrong for lawyers to
ask" mental health professionals to reveal confidences when they themselves are prohibited from doing
so. Id. "Both the disclosure and the request for the disclosure are morally proscribed by a basic princi-
ple of professional ethics." Id.
An article in the American Medical News points to a similar paradox in medical licensing.
Linda Oberman, Do Licensing Boards Need Your Medical History?, AM. MED. NEWS, May 3, 1993, at
3. "Although physicians are required to keep patients' records confidential, they generally must give
state licensing boards a guided tour through their own medical histories." Id.
The second possible source for information about an applicant's mental health, according to
Elliston, is the applicant himself, where "the relevant moral principle" is the right to privacy. The fifth
amendment provides a corollary moral right to protect individuals from being compelled to reveal
damaging information about themselves. "[Rlequiring an applicant to furnish information about his past
which may be used to deny him admission to the bar is very much like requiring a witness to testify
against himself." Elliston, at 13.
Finally, the third source is others who know about the applicant's mental condition-support
groups, counselors, or friends. Elliston rejects asking these people because they typically obtained the
information when the applicant came to them for help with his problems. "The willingness to seek
help is an important first step on the road to mental health. To disqualify the person who takes this
step while admitting the person who does not is wrong-headed, and it would be a weak defense . . .
simply to say that nothing can be done about those who do not seek help." Id.
42. In a case which advocates argue supports these questions, the Supreme Court held that bar
committees could ask whether an applicant belonged to the Communist Party even if he could not be
excluded for membership. Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36 (1961). The Court said
the answer might lead to other information relevant to the applicant's fitness to practice. Id. at 45-47.
The attorney for an applicant who refused to answer these questions objected. "The logic would be:
We can search your house without a warrant to see if there's any reason that we should get a war-
rant." John Murawski, Fitness vs. Stereotype: Can Bar Examiners Seek Psychiatric Records, LEGAL
TIMEs, Jan. 13, 1992, at 1 (quoting Donald Dinan).
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These data demonstrate that most state bar examiners and medical boards ask about
applicants' substance abuse and mental illness. Similarly, most of these boards ask
about applicants' treatment for mental illness and substance abuse.43 Affirmative re-
sponses to these inquiries generally lead to further investigation, often demanding
therapists to supply details about an applicant's illness and treatment.4
The fact that few boards of either profession inquire about physical illness dem-
onstrates prejudice against mental disorders and a basic misunderstanding of mental
illness. By asking only about mental or emotional problems, rather than any illness,
licensing boards invidiously discriminate against a particular group.45 Because no
clear distinction between mental and physical illness exists, this discrimination is sim-
ply indefensible.
Illnesses generally considered mental disorders have physiological causes. '
Symptoms of physical problems often mimic symptoms generally associated with
mental diseases. Indeed, the insurance industry has been compelled to recognize that
an overlap exists. For example, an Arkansas court held that because the cause of bipo-
lar affective disorder-formerly labeled manic-depression-was organic, an insurance
43. The only bar applications received which did not ask about treatment for mental illness were
Illinois, Nebraska, New Hampshire, South Dakota, Utah and Vermont. Among the applications re-
ceived for license to practice medicine, all but Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
Hawaii, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, Utah, West Virginia, and Wyoming asked about treatment for mental or emotional disorders.
44. The primary benefit of the current approach is that it eases the burden and the expense of
investigating applicants. Stephen T. Maher & Dr. Lori Blum, A Strategy for Increasing the Mental and
Emotional Fitness of Bar Applicants, 23 IND. L. REv. 821, 828-29 (1990). Boards seek information
directly from the applicant's therapist. Assuming the applicant was honest during treatment, and the
therapist cooperates, such an inquiry "may reveal the best information available concerning the
applicant's mental and emotional health." Id. at 829. Nevertheless, this approach probably fails to de-
tect those who are mentally unfit because applicants who are most in need of treatment may not have
sought help. Id.
Further, any possible benefits are outweighed by the high costs. Time and resources of bar
examiners are wasted in additional investigation of certain applicants. Applicants suffer economically
and emotionally if admission is delayed and the issue of their mental health becomes public. A less
obvious, but important, cost is lost opportunity "to prepare lawyers for the stress of practice through
the use of mental health resources available before admission to the bar." Id. This is because, the
authors argue, these inquiries discourage, or at least interfere with, treatment. As a result, students do
not learn healthy ways to deal with stress. When, as attorneys, they find themselves in a competitive,
stressful practice, they have not developed effective methods of coping. Id. at 829-46.
The authors suggest bar examiners "focus their initial inquiry on whether applicants have had
serious life problems." Id. at 859. An affirmative response would "raise the question of fitness." Id.
Applicants who have experienced "serious life problems" could be asked whether they sought treat-
ment. If so, bar examiners could inquire about any treatment including counseling. However, "Itihe fact
that an individual has sought and obtained counseling should not raise the question of fitness." Id.
The authors concede this narrower inquiry "is a compromise and, like all compromises, is both
positive and negative. On the positive side, it will make counseling more available and protect the
integrity of some treatment . . . . On the negative side, the modification recommended does not solve
all the problems of the inquire and exclude approach." Id. at 860.
The authors suggest an important reason for the compromise is a "more realistic chance of
adoption" than a more radical approach. Id. Unfortunately, however, the compromise fails to address
the real problem with the current system. The issue is conduct, not mental illness-even if emotional
problems are a result of "serious life problems." The presumption that such problems "raise the ques-
tion of fitness" is simply unacceptable. Instead, only harmful behavior should "raise the question of
fitness."
45. This is exactly the type of invidious discrimination the ADA was enacted to eliminate. See
infra notes 86-99 and accompanying text.
46. Equitable Life Ins. Soc. of U.S. v. Berry, 260 Cal. Rptr. 819, 824 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
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policy's mental illness limitation was not applicable .4 All but one of the experts testi-
fied that the cause of the illness was physical, even though they agreed that the disor-
der was classified as a mental condition and its symptoms fell within a classification
for mental disorder. The court cited persuasive authority to support its conclusion that
the trend is toward classifying illness by cause rather than symptoms. 48
In a more recent case, the Ninth Circuit decided that autism is not a mental
disorder.' Expert testimony defined mental illness as "refer[ring] to a behavioral dis-
turbance with no demonstrable organic or physical basis."5 ° This definition is difficult
to defend because of the organic or physical origin of many mental disorders. This
same basic misunderstanding leads professional boards to ask questions only about
mental-not physical-illness. In fact, certain illnesses characterized as physical may
cause behavior which could adversely impact on an individual's ability to practice
competently." But the answer is not to ask about all illnesses. Instead, professional
boards must ask about behavior-whatever its cause.
III. MENTAL ILLNESS
Before 1980, psychiatric diagnosis was based on the theory that most mental
disorders were results of social, psychological, or developmental factors. In the 1980s,
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Third Edition, and its revi-
sion,52 established a system utilizing symptom complexes for classifying mental disor-
ders. This new system resulted in greater reliability and reproducibility in diagnosis
from examiner to examiner.
Based on this manual, the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) designed
a Diagnostic Interview Schedule (DIS).53 DIS was used to interview a randomized
population to determine actual prevalence of mental illness in the United States. This
Epidemiologic Catchment Area (ECA) study sampled and interviewed 18,571 house-
holds and 2,290 institutional residents aged eighteen years and over in five areas across
the country.' For the first time, advances in psychiatric diagnosis, a standardized in-
terviewing technique, and a large, random sampling provided information on the true
incidence and prevalence of mental disorders. Prior to this study, estimates of the
prevalence and significance of psychiatric diagnosis were mere speculation.
The ECA study determined twenty-two percent of the population suffer from
mental illness. When substance abuse is added, the overall incidence rises to twenty-
47. Arkansas Blue Cross and Blue Shield v. Doe, 733 S.W.2d 429 (Ark. Ct. App. 1987).
48. Id. at 432. But see Brewer v. Lincoln National Life Ins., 921 F.2d 150 (8th Cir. 1990). The
Brewer court said that the insured son's illness manifested in "depression, mood swings and unusual
behavior . . . commonly characterized as mental illnesses." Id. at 154. Lay persons focus on symp-
toms, rather than cause, and the insurance policies did not limit mental illness to only those without a
physical origin. Consequently, the policies' mental illness limitation was applicable.
49. Kunin v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 910 F.2d 534, 538 (9th Cir. 1990).
50. Id. (quoting testimony of Drs. Ritvo and Freeman).
51. For example, a person suffering from diabetes may become confused, disoriented, and lose
intellectual functions when either hypo- or hyperglycemic.
52. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(3d ed. rev. 1987).
53. See generally L.N. Robins et. al., National Institute of Mental Health Diagnostic Interview
Schedule: Its History, Characteristics, and Validity, 38 ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY 381 (1981).
54. See generally D.A. Regier et. al., The NIMH Epidemiologic Catchment Area Program., 41
ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY 934 (1984).
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eight percent." Contrast this with earlier assessments, some estimating incidence of
mental illness in the population as high as eighty-two percent. 6 Conclusions about
mental disorders based on erroneous statistics generated before the ECA study must
have colored decisions relying on them. Results and current implications of data devel-
oped using DSM-II-R, DIS, and ECA are important to demonstrate the need to dis-
card invalid theories based on obsolete hypotheses.
Approximately one-third of the twenty-eight percent of Americans who suffer
from a diagnosable mental illness experience some functional disability caused by their
psychiatric condition."' One-third of those with a mental illness consult a mental
health professional, not necessarily the same third who are disabled by their mental
disorder. Of those who seek treatment, fifty-four per cent have a mental disorder which
can be diagnosed."8 While significant, this obviously means nearly half of those treat-
ed by a mental health professional have no mental disorder.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVACY ISSUES
The right to privacy is not absolute. 9 When the issue is disclosure of personal
matters,' such as mental illness or substance abuse, the Court applies a flexible bal-
ancing test.6 The standard of review ranges from intermediate to strict depending on
the extent of the intrusion.62 "[Als the sensitivity of the personal information dis-
closed, and hence the intrusion on the right to confidentiality, increases the burden on
the state to justify a disclosure will increase under the balancing test."63 To determine
whether an invasion of privacy is justified, certain factors--including injury from
disclosure, adequacy of safeguards to avoid inappropriate disclosure, and need for ac-
cess-should be considered.
Courts have consistently rejected challenges based on an applicant's constitu-
tional right to privacy in licensing cases. They hold the compelling interest in permit-
55. Id.
56. L. Srole et. al., The Midtown Manhattan Study, in I MENTAL HEALTH IN THE METROPOLIS
(1962).
57. D.A. Regier et. al., The de Facto US Mental and Affective Disorders Service System; Epidemi-
ologic Catchment Area Prospective 1-Year Prevalence Rates of Disorders and Services, 50 ARCHIVES
OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY 85 (1993).
58. W.E. Narrow et. al., Use of Services by Persons with Mental and Addictive Disorders; Find-
ing from National Institute of Mental Health Catchment Program, 50 ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY
95 (1993).
59. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 270 (1990); Bowers' v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-55 (1973).
60. Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 5 v. Philadelphia, 812 F.2d 105, 110 (3d Cir. 1987). The
constitutional right to privacy actually encompasses two interests. One is the interest in avoiding dis-
closure of private matters. When this is the interest involved, courts use a balancing test. The second
is an interest in freedom to make certain important decisions. Here, the court used strict scrutiny. Id.
at 109.
61. Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 458 (1977).
62. 812 F.2d at 110.
63. Hawaii Psychiatric Society v. Ariyoshi, 481 F. Supp. 1028 (D. Haw. 1979).
64. These factors are:
the type of record requested, the information it does or might contain, the potential for
harm in any subsequent nonconsensual disclosure, the injury from disclosure to the rela-
tionship in which the record was generated, the adequacy of safeguards to prevent unau-
thorized disclosure, the degree of need for access, and whether there is an express statu-
tory mandate, articulated public policy, or other recognizable public interest militating
toward access.
Id. at 110 (quoting U.S. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 578 (3d Cir. 1980)).
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ting only those who are fit to practice outweighs the individual's rights,' even in ju-
risdictions such as Florida where the state constitution explicitly provides a right of
privacy.
The Florida Supreme Court conceded questions regarding mental illness and sub-
stance abuse implicate an applicant's right to privacy in Florida Board of Bar Examin-
ers Re: Applicant.' Nevertheless, the court said, "pressures placed on an attorney are
enormous and his mental and emotional stability should be at such a level that he is
able to handle his responsibility." '67 The court is obviously correct. Professionals do
face extraordinary stress and must be able to handle responsibility. Unfortunately,
however, the court approved an invalid method for deciding whether the professional
can handle responsibility. Rather than focusing on the applicant's past conduct under
stress," the court permitted inquiries about treatment for mental illness and substance
abuse.
The court avoided deciding the appropriate standard of review by concluding that
these questions survive even strict scrutiny. The justices were correct that a compelling
state interest to protect the public exists.' But, they erred in finding that these ques-
tions are the least intrusive means to effectuate that interest.70 Without any proof,
merely by repeating the assertion, the justices concluded "[tihe means employed by the
Board cannot be narrowed without impinging on the Board's effectiveness in carrying
out its important responsibilities."'" The court makes this mistake because it failed to
understand mental illness. It is not illness-and certainly not treatment for an ill-
ness-which causes injury to clients or patients. Instead, it is conduct. Therefore, the
means that boards choose to protect the public from incompetent profession-
als-questions about mental illness and substance abuse-are not narrowly tailored to
effectuate that interest. In fact, because these inquiries focus on the wrong issues, they
fail to effectuate this important interest at all.
The Florida Supreme Court also rejected related confidentiality and privilege
arguments. Disingenously, the majority claimed applicants do not enjoy these rights
because, by applying to the bar, they place their "mental and emotional fitness" at
issue.72 An analogous federal case exposes the flaw in this argument.
The Third Circuit recognized that it is "illusory" to treat police applicants for a
special investigative unit as volunteers. 3 Additionally, the court rejected the notion
that government can condition employment on a waiver of constitutional rights because
65. See, e.g., Florida Board of Bar Examiners Re: Applicant, 443 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1983); Arizona
Appellate Decisions, 19 ARIZ. L. REv. 672 (1977).
66. 443 So. 2d at 74.
67. Id. at 75.
68. In fact, the rules for admission in some states even recognize this as the appropriate focus for
inquiry. For example, the Florida Supreme Court rules for admission to the bar provide "[aln attorney
.should be one whose conduct justifies the trust of clients, adversaries, courts, and others with respect
to the professional duties owed to them." RULES OF THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT RELATING TO AD-
MISSION TO THE BAR III.B.2.b. (1992) (emphasis added).
69. 443 So. 2d at 75.
70. Id. at 74-76.
71. Id. at 76.
72. Id. at 76-77. The majority incorrectly supported this claim with statutory provisions denying
confidentiality and privilege to a patient who "relies upon the condition as an element of a claim or
defense." Id. at 77 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 90.503 (1981)).
73. Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 5, 812 F.2d at Ill.
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"that would eviscerate the court's opinion establishing a balancing standard."'74 Thus,
the court held that the "voluntary nature of the application" was not a "basis to preter-
mit analysis of whether the condition of employment violates the applicants' privacy
rights.""
Applicants objected to questions which included inquiries regarding physical and
mental conditions.76 Because responses to these questions might "contain intimate
facts about one's body and state of health, 77 answers are within an individual's rea-
sonable expectations of privacy and entitled to protection." "The more intimate or
personal the information, the more justified is the expectation that it will not be subject
to public scrutiny. '"" Medical information is considered confidential; information
about history of or treatment for mental illness is particularly sensitive.' Neverthe-
less, the Third Circuit upheld the questions, arguing that the individual's interest was
decreased because historically applicants faced similar inquiries. This means an
individual's expectation of privacy would be reduced because other applicants had
been questioned about their mental health. The obvious problem with this argument is
that many applicants sought counseling years before they applied for this special unit,
or for a license to practice medicine or law. In other words, at the time the applicant
consulted a mental health professional he had no reason to expect restrictions on his
privacy or limitations on confidentiality.8
Professional licensing boards compel applicants to respond to all questions.
Courts concede that these questions implicate privacy rights." The invasion of pri-
vacy constitutes injury," regardless of whether any further disclosure or investigation
74. Id. at 112.
75. Id.
76. Id. The challenged questions included:
18. List any physical defects or disability, also list any extended time spent in the hospi-
tal for any reason.
19. Are you presently using any prescription drugs? If yes, state the drug, the need for
it and the dosage.
20. Are you now or have you ever been attended, treated or observed by any doctor or
psychiatrist or at any Hospital or Mental Institution on an in-patient or out-patient basis
for any mental or psychiatric condition? If yes, give the dates and the nature of the
treatment.
Id. (emphasis in original).
77. Id.
78. One simple example illustrates judicial awareness of the sensitive nature of these inquiries. A
federal district judge in Connecticut sealed portions of the record and permitted an applicant who
challenged the questions to use a pseudonym "[b]ecause of potentially embarrassing and personal infor-
mation." Thomas Scheffey, Applicant Claims Bar Query Violates ADA, CONN. L. TRIB., Aug. 10,
1992, at 1.
79. 812 F.2d at 112-13.
80. "The psychiatric patient confides more utterly than anyone else in the world. He exposes to
the therapist not only what his words directly express; he lays bare his entire self, his dreams, his
fantasies, his sins and his shame." Taylor v. United States, 222 F.2d 398, 401 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (quot-
ing GUTMACHER & WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAw 272 (1952)).
81. "Every patient, and particularly every patient undergoing psychoanalysis, has such a right to
privacy. Under what circumstances can a person be expected to reveal sexual fantasies, infantile memo-
ries, passions of hate and love, one's most intimate relationship with one's spouse and others except
upon the inferential agreement that such confessions will be forever entombed in the psychiatrist's
memory, never to be revealed during the psychiatrist's lifetime or thereafter? The very needs of the
profession itself require that confidentiality exist and be enforced." Doe v. Roe, 400 N.Y.S.2d 668, 676
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977).
82. See supra notes 67-82 and accompanying text.
83. For example, the current practice of asking about treatment tends to make students reluctant to
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occurs.8
V. ADA
A. The Act
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA") was passed to protect 43
million disabled Americans" from discrimination."6 As a step toward achieving this
goal, the Act elevates persons with disabilities to suspect class status.' With this sim-
ple stroke of the pen, legislators maximized the probability of eliminating discrimina-
tion8 by heightening the standard of review to strict scrutiny."
Questions about treatment for mental illness and substance abuse on licensing
applications simply cannot withstand this scrutiny.' In fact, cases in several states
seek treatment. The Report of the American Association of Law Schools Special Committee on Prob-
lems of Substance Abuse recently recognized this problem. "Rightly or wrongly, students may calculate
that if they do not tell anyone about the problem, do not have it diagnosed, and avoid treatment, there
is no obligation to disclose anything to a bar admission authority." Report of the American Association
of Law Schools Special Committee on Problems of Substance Abuse, 44 J. LEGAL EDUC. 35, 54-55
(March 1994).
Law students were surveyed to see whether they would seek treatment if they believed they had
a substance abuse problem. Ten percent said "yes." However, another 41 percent said they would seek
help if bar examiners could not get the information. Another question asked students if they would
refer a troubled law school classmate to counseling. The numbers were equally disparate: 19 percent
said "yes," another 47 percent said "yes" if bar examiners would not get the information.
"These answers, together with considerable anecdotal evidence, indicate that law students' con-
cerns about confidentiality probably reduce significantly not only the number of students willing to
self-refer but also the number who would report an impaired colleague." Id. at 55. Discouraging stu-
dents from obtaining help is contrary to the interests of the individual and the public.
84. Unfortunately, not all courts agree. A New Jersey federal district court recently concluded, in
dicta, that it is not the questions which discriminate. The Medical Society of New Jersey v. Jacobs,
1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14294 (D.N.J. Oct. 5, 1993). "Theoretically," the court opined, the board could
ask the questions but never act on the information received. Instead, "it is the extra investigation of
qualified applicants who answer 'yes' to one of the challenged questions that constitutes invidious
discrimination." Id. at 16.
The issue before the court was a petition for temporary injunction. Based on the court's deci-
sion that the injury is additional investigation, not the "mere asking of questions," and plaintiffs' fail-
ure to prove further investigations were imminent, the court denied the injunction.
85. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(7). In the Act, Congress declares "individuals with disabilities are a dis-
crete and insular minority who have been faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history
of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our society,
based on characteristics that are beyond the control of such individuals. ... Id.
These Congressional findings track Supreme Court case law establishing criteria for suspect class
status. By its language, "Congress clearly intended to create a new protected class-the disabled." Amy
Scott Lowndes, The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990: A Congressional Mandate for Heightened
Judicial Protection of Disabled Persons, 44 U. FLA. L. REV. 417, 446 (1992). Ms. Lowndes argues
that the findings provide the Court "data to accurately assess the equal protection claims of the dis-
abled as a class." Id. at 448. Rather than the distinctions being "purely the product of physical or
mental imperfection," these findings confirm "individuals with disabilities labor under the additional
burden of society's ignorance, prejudice and stigmatization which inexorably widen the gulf between
perception and reality." Id.
88. The ADA has even been dubbed the "'emancipation proclamation' for people with disabilities
in America, and its date of enactment 'liberation day for the disabled."' 20 THE AMERICANS' WITH
DISABILMEs ACr OF 1990: INTRODUCTION; WHO Is DISABLED (1992).
89. Where either a suspect class or fundamental right is involved, the Court examines legislation
and regulations using a strict scrutiny test. This means that there must be a compelling state interest
and legislation or regulations must be narrowly tailored to effectuate that state interest.
90. The American Bar Association has "consistently condemned" any discrimination. In line with
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allege that the ADA prohibits questions about mental illness9 ' on licensing or reli-
censing applications. Analysis of statutory provisions and analogous cases decided
either under the Act or earlier legislation92 portends success. Because these questions
discriminate based on disability, they must be eliminated. 93
that policy, the Commission on Mental and Physical Disability Law recommended eliminating questions
on state bar applications which discriminate by inquiring into an applicant's treatment for mental ill-
ness. ABA Report on Resolution Concerning Inquiries Into Mental Health Treatment of Bar Applicants.
The Commission acknowledged state bars have "a legitimate interest in assuring the character
and fitness" of individuals they license. However, "[allthough presumably intended to protect the public
and the profession from unfit lawyers, questions about a person's mental health history are ill-suited to
do so." Id. at 3. Instead, the necessary information can be obtained through questions-to applicants
and their references-about specific behavior that "comprise[s] good moral character or fitness to prac-
rice." Id.
In addition to failure to elicit answers which reflect on character and fitness, the Commission
raises other important objections to current questions. "Such questions likely violate the Americans with
Disabilities Act, irredeemably abridge applicants' privacy interests, and-to the extent they deter poten-
tial attorneys from seeking treatment-have deleterious effects on the mental health and emotional well-
being of some members of the legal profession." Id.
The resolution has been revised and now provides:
BE IT RESOLVED, that the American Bar Association recommends to the extent
that state bar examiners seek to obtain information regarding one's mental or emotional
fitness, they should limit their inquiries to questions that seek to ascertain the following:
(1) whether the applicant has exhibited specific behaviors related to character and fitness,
such as the individual's conduct, exercise of responsibility, trustworthiness, integrity and
reliability; or
(2) whether an applicant has a condition that significantly impairs that applicant's ability
to exercise the responsibilities of an attorney such as handling funds, exercising indepen-
dent judgment, meeting deadlines, or otherwise affecting the representation of clients.
Proposed resolution regarding disability-related questions asked by bar examiners.
The American Psychiatric Association ("APA") is also concerned about the discriminatory effect
of these questions on state medical licensing applications. The APA acknowledges medical boards are
charged with protecting the public from impaired physicians but objects to "inappropriate and
indiscriminant disclosure of a history of psychiatric consultation and treatment . . . . Such disclosure
stigmatizes individuals who seek consultation and treatment, equates help seeking behavior with the
existence of problems sufficient to cause impairment, singles out psychiatric treatment for discriminato-
ry attention, and exposes those who report treatment to breaches of confidentiality." Work Group on
Disclosure of APA, Recommended Guidelines Concerning Disclosure and Confidentiality (Dec. 1992).
In addition to suggested guidelines, the Work Group proposed an appropriate question for a
residency application:
Since you became a medical student, have you ever had an emotional disturbance, men-
tal illness, physical illness or dependency on alcohol or drugs, which has impaired your
ability to practice medicine or to function as a student of medicine?
Similar to the bar committee on disability, the APA work group question focused on the only impor-
tant issues-impairment and ability to function.
91. See, e.g., Ellen S. v. Florida Board of Bar Examiners, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10842 (S.D.
Fla 1994), Richard Roe v. Connecticut Bar Examining Committee (D.C. Conn. 1993) (cited in Thomas
Scheffey, Applicant Sues Bar Examiners over Mental Health Queries, CONN. L. TRwi., May 31, 1993);
The Medical Society of New Jersey v. Jacobs, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14294 (D.N.J. Oct. 5, 1993);
John Doe v. Connecticut Bar Examining Committee and R. David Stamm (D. Conn. 1992) (cited in
Bar Examiners Run Afoul of New Disabilities Law, CONN. L. TRIB., Aug. 10, 1992, at 10).
92. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988 & Supp. 1992).
93. A district court in New Jersey seemed to have little difficulty concluding that the ADA ap-
plied to these questions. 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14294. Unfortunately, the court's analysis and conclu-
sion were dicta because the issue was whether to grant a temporary injunction against use of the
questions. Nevertheless, the court recognized the board's "important, and sometimes very difficult, func-
tion" does not justify "carryling] out its duties in a fashion that discriminates against applicants with
disabilities" based on their status. Id. at 22. Thus, the court concluded that applicants had a "high
probability of success" on the merits. Id.
In an earlier case, the New Jersey Supreme Court avoided the issue of applicability of the Act
because of delay in raising the claim until after the court granted plaintiffs' petition for certification.
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The Act is divided into several parts. Preliminary provisions include discussion
of pervasiveness of discrimination based on disability and a statement of purpose to
establish a national commitment and standards* to eliminate discrimination. Title I
prohibits discrimination in employment. Title II extends protection to "benefits of the
services, programs, or activities of a public entity." Title III focuses on public accom-
modations and services of private entities. Title IV mandates establishing telecommuni-
cation relay systems and requires federally funded public service announcements be
close captioned. Finally, Title V contains miscellaneous sections, including a waiver of
state immunity9' and provision for attorneys' fees and litigation costs to the prevailing
party at judicial or agency discretion.
B. Disability
The ADA defines disability to include not only "a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities"'95 but also "a record
of such impairment"" or "being regarded as having such an impairment."97 This ex-
panded protection was necessary because "society's accumulated myths and fears about
disability are as handicapping as are physical limitations that flow from actual impair-
ment.""8
' Questions about mental illness and substance abuse demonstrate licensing boards
have fallen victim to these "accumulated myths and fears about disability." The only
reason to ask the questions is the mistaken notion that being "regarded as" dis-
abled-based on affirmative responses to these inquiries-indicates an applicant is
impaired.
Hirsch v. New Jersey State Board of Medical Examiners, 607 A.2d 986 (N.J. 1992). However, justices
seemed to experience discomfort with the questions and suggested possible merit in the ADA argu-
ment.
Plaintiffs-Stuart Hirsh, M.D., the Medical Society of New Jersey, and the New Jersey Society
of Osteopathic Physicians and Surgeons--challenged several questions on the biennial license renewal
application, including inquiries about "past or present impairment based on drug or mental or emotion-
al illness." Hirsch v. New Jersey State Board of Medical Examiners, 600 A.2d 493, 496 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1991). Two questions are relevant:
"Have you suffered from or been treated for any mental illness or psychiatric problem at
any time during the past 10 years?" Question 9(f).
"Have you ever been granted a leave of absence by a healthcare facility, HMO, or any
employer for reasons that relate to any physical, mental, or emotional condition (other
than parental leave) or any drug or alcohol problem at any time during the past 10
years?" Question 9(g).
Id. at 495-96.
The supreme court upheld these inquiries "[allthough some of the questions could benefit from
reformulation to achieve a better-defined focus and to reflect a more sensitive appreciation of the pri-
vacy concerns of those who must answer." 607 A.2d at 987. The court deferred "a definitive ruling"
on the ADA claim until a case where the issue had been fully developed. Id.
94. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988 & Supp. 1992), did not abrogate
Eleventh Amendment immunity. Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 246 (1985). The
specific waiver of immunity under the ADA indicates Congress' increased commitment to eliminating
all discrimination.
95. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1992).
96. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B) (Supp. IV 1992).
97. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) (Supp. IV 1992).
98. Schoolboard of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987). Although the case was
decided under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, the conclusion is relevant because the
ADA uses the previous act as a guide. One of the purposes of the ADA is to expand protection
granted by this earlier legislation to disabled individuals.
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Licensing boards do need to know if an individual is impaired. The applicant or
professional who is actually impaired might pose increased risk to his clients or pa-
tients. However, contrary to the presumption inherent in questions about mental illness
and substance abuse, neither clients nor patients face additional risk of harm from the
individual who is only "regarded as" having a disability. The truth is, despite pervasive
but unfounded prejudice, an applicant who is "regarded as" having a disability 1) may
never be impaired by his disorder or 2) may not actually have a mental illness at all."
The ADA included protection for people regarded as having a disability specifically to
prevent the invidious discrimination of treating all disabled persons as impaired. Nei-
ther disability, nor being regarded as disabled, is synonymous with impairment. Only
one-third of those suffering from mental disorder are functionally impaired," and
almost half the people who consult a mental health professional do not have a diagnos-
able mental illness.' When these facts are understood, the conclusion is obvious: the
individual who is regarded as having a disability generally presents no more or less
danger to clients or patients than any other applicant.
C. Discrimination
Recognizing myths and stereotypes often incorrectly equate disability with im-
pairment, the Act prohibits discriminating against qualified individuals because of their
disability."u Construction of "discrimination" under the ADA serves to invalidate
questions about treatment for mental illness and substance abuse. Discrimination in-
cludes "limiting, segregating, or classifying" a disabled applicant so as to adversely
affect his status or opportunity based on his disability. 3 Discrimination also includes
"utilizing standards, criteria ... that have the effect of discrimination."'" Questions
about treatment for mental illness or substance abuse inappropriately classify individu-
als and may adversely affect their status based on disability. Further, using these ques-
tions as standards or criteria for licensure "have the effect of discrimination."
The Act protects qualified individuals with disabilities from discrimination. Title
I defines a "qualified individual with a disability" as a disabled individual "who, with
or without reasonable accommodation can perform the essential functions of the em-
ployment position."' 5 To decide if a disabled applicant is being discriminated against
99. An individual is "regarded as" having a disability if an employer or covered entity's decision
was based on "myth, fear or stereotype." If the employer cannot show a non-discriminatory reason for
his actions, "an inference that the employer is acting on the basis of 'myth, fear or stereotype' can be
drawn." 28 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1) (1993) (interpretive guidance).
100. Used by the medical profession,
"impairment" means an alteration of an individual's health status that is assessed by
medical means; "disability," which is assessed by nonmedical means, is an alteration of
an individual's capacity to meet personal, social, or occupational demands or statutory or
regulatory requirements. Stated another way, "impairment" is what is wrong with a body
part or organ system and its functioning; "disability" is the gap between what the indi-
vidual can do and what the individual needs or wants to do.
An individual who is "impaired" is not necessarily "disabled." Impairment gives
rise to disability only when the medical condition limits the individual's capacity to meet
the demands of life's activities.
AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment 1-2 (emphasis in original).
101. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
102. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Supp. IV 1992) (employment); 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (Supp. IV 1992)
("benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity").
103. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1992).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(3)(A) (Supp. IV 1992).
105. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (Supp. IV 1992). This definition is in Title I. Applying this Title I
1994]
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because of his disability there must be a finding of whether he is otherwise qualified
for the job. "Otherwise qualified"" requires two factual determinations: 1) whether
the applicant can perform the "essential functions" of being a physician or lawyer, and
2) whether criteria in the application process actually measure those essential
functions."
D. Essential Functions
Defining essential functions is not easy. The decision turns on whether the func-
tions are "necessary and legitimate" requirements of the job.08 The employer bears
the burden of proving the function is essential." 9 Deference is given to the
employer's judgment of essential functions,"' but his job description must be based
on objective criteria or historical allocation of tasks performed by others in the posi-
tion."'
Just as the employer defines "essential job functions," licensing boards must
establish essential professional functions. But, rather than using objective criteria or
historical allocation of tasks, licensing boards hide behind a general requirement of
character and fitness. This is wrong. Instead, boards may only ask questions which,
according to objective criteria, deal with tasks that are essential parts of the
professional's job. Boards bear the burden of showing inquiries about mental illness
and substance abuse are "job-related ... and ... consistent with business necessi-
ty.""' 2 Title I does permit employers to defend against a charge of discrimination by
employment definition is appropriate because even though applicants are not seeking to be board em-
ployees, the licensing evaluation process is similar to a hiring decision. In addition, neither law school
nor medical school graduates can practice in their chosen professions without a license.
Title II contains a slightly different, but substantively similar, definition of "qualified individual
with a disability." See infra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
106. This is language from the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988 & Supp.
IV 1992). Presumably, a similar standard would be applied to determine a qualified individual under
the ADA. See Symons, supra note 4, at 239.
Other commentators agree. See, e.g., Matthew B. Schiff & David L. Miller, Reasonable Accom-
modations Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 28 GONZAGA L. REv. 219 (1992-93). "The
EEOC suggests a two-step determination of whether a disabled individual is qualified. First, the indi-
vidual must satisfy the prerequisites for a position, such as possessing the appropriate educational back-
ground, employment experience, skills, or licenses. Second, the individual must be able to perform the
essential functions of the position, with or without reasonable accommodation." Id. at 222.
107. See Pandazides v. Virginia Board of Education, 946 F.2d 345 (4th Cir. 1991). Because of her
learning disabilities, Sofia Pandazides was unable to pass the examination required of prospective teach-
ers in Virginia. Although Ms. Pandazides had successfully taught in the school district for two years
under temporary one year contracts-receiving the higher of two possible ratings in the second
year-because she was unable to pass the communications skills portion of the test, the board found
her "ineligible to teach." Id. at 347.
According to testimony, her learning disability prevented Ms. Pandazides from passing this por-
tion of the test. She did pass the other required portions of the exam, including the general knowledge
and professional knowledge sections. Id. at 347 n.I. The expert stated, her handicaps limited her abili-
ties in some areas, but "they have no significant impact on her ability to teach." Id. at 347.
The court concluded that employers cannot simply invoke any set of requirements to declare a
disabled applicant not otherwise qualified. Courts "must look behind the qualifications. To do otherwise
reduces the term 'otherwise qualified' and any arbitrary set of requirements to a tautology." Id. at 349.
108. Carter v. Casa Central, 849 F.2d 1048, 1056 (7th Cir. 1988).
109. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (Supp. IV 1992).
110. Id. This is true especially for written job descriptions prepared prior to advertising or inter-
viewing. Id.
111. Davis v. Frank, 711 F. Supp. 447, 453 (N.D. 111. 1989).
112. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (Supp. IV 1992). Discrimination includes using "selection criteria that
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proving that such "selection criteria that screen out or tend to screen out or otherwise
deny a job or benefit" are "job-related and consistent with business necessity."'". In
the absence of such proof, the ADA prohibits these questions.
Southeastern Community College v. Davis'4 provides an example of an appli-
cant whose disability prevented her from performing essential functions of the nursing
program."' Although she met all admission requirements, the hearing impaired appli-
cant was rejected because of her disability. The Court agreed that "legitimate physical
qualifications may be essential to participation in particular programs."" 6 Where the
physical qualifications were necessary to perform as a student or professional, the
school was not required to lower its standards to accommodate the applicant's disabili-
ty."' The ADA augmented "the 'essential functions' analysis in Davis .... plac[ing]
the burden on the employer to show the critical nature of the function.""' 8
Cases such as Delgado v. McTighe"9 suggest the need for a definitive descrip-
tion of essential functions of an attorney. Expert testimony raised several objections to
both parts of the Pennsylvania bar exam."2 The multiple choice section failed to sim-
ulate practice because, in solving clients' problems, attorneys are not faced with four
possible answers.'' The essay portion was also unreliable for two reasons: (1) poten-
tial for inconsistent grading and (2) failure to be a comprehensive test of legal knowl-
edge."
This analysis is equally applicable to questions about mental illness and sub-
stance abuse. They do not simulate skills necessary to practice because many profes-
sionals who suffer from a mental disorder or seek treatment for emotional problems or
substance abuse enjoy successful careers. Further, analogous to objections raised
against essay questions, inquiries limited to mental illness are not a comprehensive test
of an applicant's health, nor, more importantly, possible impairment. To be compre-
hensive, boards must inquire into physical illness which might also lead to impair-
ment."2 Nevertheless, professional licensing boards seldom inquire about physical
illness. 24
screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or a class of individuals with disabili-
ties." Id.
113. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) (Supp. IV 1992). This language is important as it supports the argument
that Title I provisions are applicable beyond employment, to benefits provided by public entities under
Title II. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
114. Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
115. See also Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 677 (1989).
116. 442 U.S. at 407.
117. The Court agreed with the school that hearing was essential to many job junctions of a nurse.
Id. at 408-09.
118. John J. Sarno, The Americans With Disabilities Act: Federal Mandate to Create an Integrated
Society, 17 SErON HALL LEGIS. J. 401, 413 (1993). The ADA seems to embrace the Davis principle
that a qualified person must be able to perform "'the essential functions of the employment position,'
with or without a reasonable accommodation." Id. at 413 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (Supp. IV
1992)). Further, the Act places the burden on the employer to establish that the function is critical. Id.
119. 522 F. Supp. 886 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
120. See generally W. Sherman Rogers, The ADA, Title VII, and the Bar Examination: The Nature
and Extent of the ADA's Coverage of Bar Examinations and an Analysis of the Applicability. of Title
VII to Such Tests, 36 How. L.J. 1 (1993) (discussion of the ADA and bar examinations).
121. 522 F. Supp. at 897. There was also concern that many answers were not clearly right or
wrong. Id.
122. Id. at 896.
123. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
124. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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But, the primary objection to the Pennsylvania test was that a bar exam cannot
"measure minimal competence to practice law unless some determination was made as
to what constitutes incompetent performance by an attorney."" To be valid, a test
must be an evaluative tool which actually measures ability to perform functions of an
attorney or physician. "Absent identification of these aspects and proof that the exami-
nation measures them, a state may be applying a permissible standard of qualifica-
tion-proficiency in the state's law-with no basis for finding that unsuccessful appli-
cants fail to meet that standard."'"
The same is true for inquiries into an applicant's treatment for mental illness or
substance abuse. Boards ask these questions under the rubric of determining fitness to
practice. Establishing fitness as a "permissible standard of qualification" is not suffi-
cient. Boards must also prove what functions might be affected and whether answers to
the questions actually help assess an applicant's fitness.'27 However, absent a clear
definition of minimal competence, boards cannot determine in what ways, if at all,
mental illness affects competence.
Because licensing boards have defined neither essential functions nor connection
to inquiries about treatment for mental illness or substance abuse, the questions must
be eliminated. They should be replaced by inquiries designed to elicit meaningful
information concerning an applicant's ability to perform competently. 28
Suppose, for example, a board establishes-as it seems likely it could-that one
essential function of an attorney is to deal honestly with clients and other lawyers."2
Questions concerning an applicant's integrity in other professional, educational and
even personal, relationships would then be appropriate. Similar analysis is possible for
the physician. Presumably a medical board would have little difficulty establishing that
an important function of being a doctor is ability to analyze and integrate a vast body
of information. Questions concerning an applicant's analytical and integrative skills in
other professional, educational and even personal, situations would then be appropriate.
By contrast, questions about treatment for or history of mental illness or substance
abuse are improper because responses fail to provide information about the applicant's
ability to be a competent lawyer or doctor.
Boards have not established a nexus between history of or treatment for mental
illness or substance abuse and inability to practice competently. Instead, behav-
ior-which may or may not be associated with mental disorders-impacts upon ability
to perform essential functions of an attorney or physician. The best predictor of behav-
ior is past conduct. Therefore, to determine if an applicant-with or without a history
of mental illness-is qualified, boards should ask about patterns of past conduct which,
if they recur, might impair the applicant's ability to practice with skill and safety.
125. Id.
126. Licensed Professionals, supra note 9, at 280.
127. "[C]ompetent professionals are necessary to protect public health and safety," but where "eval-
uation tools do not measure job-related skills, then the primary effect of the measures, and perhaps
their true purpose, is to control entry into the profession." Id. at 283. This is especially problematic
because the vast majority of-and sometimes all-board members are professionals who will be in
competition with the applicant if he is licensed. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
128. See infra note 130 and accompanying text.
129. See, e.g., People v. Heibrunn, 814 P.2d 819, 820-21 (Colo. 1991) (where the court agreed that
at least 17 instances of an attorney's "neglect, deception, and ultimate abandonment of his clients"
were grounds for discipline).
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Some courts do recognize that the important question is behavior, not treatment
for or history of mental illness or substance abuse. For example, one court recognized
an employer could discharge a paranoid schizophrenic who demonstrated antisocial
behavior."3 Plaintiff failed to take medication which controlled her condition and
was fired because of several "threatening and belligerent" incidents and at least three
violent episodes. 3' The record established that plaintiff was "suffering from a severe
mental illness."'3 Discharging her was not discrimination, however, because she was
not otherwise qualified for the position. Plaintiff's condition was controllable with
medication she chose not to take. Even if her behavior was a direct result of her ill-
ness, she is "clearly not 'otherwise qualified,' but simply an individual unwilling to
perform the function of her job."' Because plaintiff was discharged for her behav-
ior, rather than her mental illness, she is "not a victim of discrimination.""
The Act permits an employer to reject an applicant who poses a "direct threat" to
the health or safety of others in the workplace. 3 Similarly, bar examiners and medi-
cal boards may exclude applicants who pose a "direct threat" in their
workplace--clients or patients. However, ADA regulations require that this assessment
be "based on a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current medical
knowledge ... ."" Indeed, "[flor individuals with mental and emotional disabilities,
the employer must identify the specific behavior on the part of the employee that
would pose the direct threat."'
37
130. Franklin v. U.S. Postal Service, 687 F. Supp. 1214, 1219 (S.D. Ohio .1988).
131. Id. at 1216.
132. Id. at 1218.
133. Id. at 1219.
.134. Id. In another case, a student filed an action for readmission to medical school. Doe v. New
York University, 666 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1981). The trial judge did not focus on treatment for
plaintiff's "serious psychiatric problem." Id. at 767. Doctors diagnosed her as a borderline personality.
Id. at 768. Instead, the judge correctly relied on her "actual behavior and condition over the past five
years." Id. at 772.
135. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (Supp. IV 1992) ("The term 'qualification standard' may include a
requirement that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals
in the workplace.").
The EEOC regulation goes beyond the language of the Act. The regulations define direct threat
to include "a significant risk, of substantial harm" to the individual himself or others. 28 C.F.R. §
1630.2(r) (1993).
One author suggests that this is a "major gaffe" by the EEOC. Charles D. Goldman, Commen-
tary, Americans with Disabilities Act: Dispelling the Myths. A Practical Guide to EEOC's Voodoo Civil
Rights and Wrongs, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 73, 85 (1992). Resolution of this conflict is unnecessary for
purposes of this article. Boards ask the questions to protect clients or patients, not the applicant him-
self.
A direct threat requires a "high probability, of substantial harm; a speculative or remote risk is
insufficient." 28 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (1993) (interpretive guidance). The determination of whether an
applicant is a direct threat "must rely on objective, factual evidence-not on subjective perceptions,
irrational fears, patronizing attitudes or stereotypes-about the nature or effect of a particular disability,
or of disability generally." Id.
An employer cannot simply assume a person suffering from or treated for a mental illness poses
a direct threat. Such an assumption would be based on fear and stereotype. The "direct threat" stan-
dard was created to prevent treating disabled individuals differently from others unless the need for
disparate treatment was based on objective evidence. 136 CONG. REC. H2599 (1990).
136. 28 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (1993) (interpretive guidance).
137. Id. (emphasis added). This argument is buttressed by the different focus for physical disabili-
ties. Rather than target behavior-as the regulation does for mental disorders-where the issue is phys-
ical disability "the employer must identify the aspect of the disability that would pose the direct
threat." Id. (emphasis added).
Journal of Legislation
This means that the behavior of a person with a disability may render him "not
otherwise qualified," thus denying him the protection of the ADA. Adams v.
Alderson.38 is illustrative. A former federal employee brought an action under the Re-
habilitation Act of 1973. The court concluded that, even assuming the employee suf-
fered from an adjustment disorder,'39 his violence toward his superior meant he was
"simply not otherwise qualified for employment.""' An employer is "not obliged to
indulge a propensity for violence-even if engendered by a 'handicapping' mental ill-
ness.""4 Otherwise qualified means the ability to perform essential job functions.
Violent behavior towards fellow employees-regardless of cause-interferes with an
individual's ability to perform job functions. Therefore, an employer may reject an
applicant whose violent behavior poses a direct threat. Inquiries must focus on past
violence rather than what might have "engendered" the behavior, even if the probable
cause is mental illness or substance abuse.
E. Reasonable Accommodations
If an individual's behavior is not a direct threat, but he suffers from a disability
which might affect ability to perform as an attorney or physician, boards must show
they have made a reasonable accommodation.'42 Factors generally used to excuse the
obligation when compelling an accommodation that would "impose an undue hard-
ship" 43 are not applicable to professional boards.
Unfortunately, no bright line exists to distinguish a legitimate refusal to make
accommodations from illegal discrimination against a qualified individual.'" "Tech-
nological advances can be expected to enhance opportunities to rehabilitate the handi-
capped or otherwise to qualify them for some useful employment,"'45 further blurring
the current ambiguous distinction. Indeed, recent medical research about prevalence
and effect of mental illness-analogous to these predicted technological advanc-
es-should enhance the disabled individual's opportunity to be free of discrimination.
The Supreme Court has conceded that "situations may arise where a refusal to modify
an existing program might become unreasonable and discriminatory."'" Based on
this new medical research, 47 failure to eliminate questions about mental illness and
substance abuse on licensure applications falls into this category of "unreasonable and
discriminatory."
Licensing boards do grant conditional admissions, imposing limitations on an
applicant's license to practice. Restrictions such as practicing only under supervision,
requiring monitoring by a physician, or entering a substance abuse program are typi-
cal. ' Boards might argue these conditional admissions represent reasonable accom-
138. 723 F. Supp. 1531 (D.D.C. 1989).
139. Plaintiff was diagnosed as having "'adjustment disorder with mixed disturbance of emotion
and conduct' and a 'compulsive personality disorder."' Id.
140. Id. at 1532. The court also refused to find the employer failed to make a reasonable accom-
modation. Id. See infra notes 143-149 and accompanying text.
141. Id.
142. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (1993).
143. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B) (1993). "[U]ndue hardship" requires "significant difficulty or ex-
pense." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A) (1993).
144. 442 U.S. at 412.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 412-13.
147. See supra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
148. Grievance committees might also impose conditions for reinstatement. For example, the Colo-
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modations. However, even assuming arguendo these conditions are "reasonable accom-
modations"-necessary to protect the public, profession, and potential clients or pa-
tients-the restrictions are inappropriate as applied because the means of identifying
persons for conditional admission violates the ADA. The entire system crumbles when
the foundation on which it is built-invalid questions about treatment for mental illness
or substance abuse-is exposed.
F. Confidentiality of Medical Information
Title I prohibits asking about disability or requiring medical examinations prior
to employment. But, under very specific, limited circumstances the Act does permit
such inquiries and examinations.'49 Nevertheless, the requirement that all medical in-
formation must be "collected and maintained on separate forms and in separate medi-
cal files and ... treated as a confidential medical record' ' i"e serves as an important
restriction. Moreover, the Act permits medical examinations only after an offer has
been made and if all employees are subjected to the same exam. 151
Contrary to the Act's express requirement, however, bar examiners and medical
boards do not ask about history of or treatment for mental illness or substance abuse
on separate forms nor maintain this confidential information in separate files. Instead,
the questions are on the general form all applicants must file; consequently, responses
are available to everyone with access to the applications. This-is not to suggest that
boards could comply with the Act simply by maintaining separate files for responses to
questions about mental illness and substance abuse. Still, compliance would strengthen
a board's argument for the continued primacy of the need for this information when
balanced against the applicant's privacy rights. In fact, courts frequently explain that
effective precautions against inappropriate disclosure weaken an individual's privacy
interest."'
For example, in Walls v. City of Petersburg,"3 an employee was fired from the
city police department because she refused to answer personal questions, including
questions regarding her sexual history. She contended that these questions violated her
constitutional right to privacy. The court disagreed." One important factor in the
rado Supreme Court approved a committee order that an attorney-whose sanction for neglect and
causing injury to clients was a year and a day suspension-undergo psychiatric evaluation before being
permitted to resume his practice. People v. Fagan, 745 P.2d 249, 252-53 (Colo. 1987). The basis of
the committee's recommendation was the attorney's "erratic behavior . . . manifested, in part, by his
conduct of the cases leading to the disciplinary action and, in part, by his conduct during the disci-
plinary proceedings. The hearing board observed that, at times, Fagan performed normally and effec-
tively but, at other times, he functioned without noticeable expression or affect and was rambling and
disorganized. There also is evidence in the record that the respondent exhibited threatening conduct
toward the deputy disciplinary prosecutor." Id. at 253.
Admission standards require applicants to show "they are mentally stable and morally and ethi-
cally qualified." Id. at 254 (quoting C.R.C.P. 201.6(1)). Further, to demonstrate whether they meet
these qualifications, applicants may have to submit to "a current mental status examination." Id.
(quoting C.R.C.P. 201.6(2)). These rules, combined with the fact that an applicant bears the burden of
establishing that he is qualified, "fully considering the previous disciplinary action," were used to sup-
port the court's conclusion that a psychiatric evaluation was an appropriate requirement for reinstate-
ment. Id. at 253-54 (quoting C.R.C.P. 241.22(c)).
149. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (1993).
150. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(3)(B) (1993).
151. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(3)(A) (1993).
152. See, e.g., Applicant, 443 So. 2d at 75.
153. 895 F.2d 188, 194 (1990).
154. Id. at 193. Her title VII claim, alleging the questions had a disparate impact, was also denied.
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court's decision was the government's procedure for avoiding unauthorized disclosure.
The confidential information was kept in a private filing cabinet which was locked at
night. The plaintiff's privacy was further protected because only four people were
authorized to access the information. 5 Professional licensing boards do not provide
similar safeguards against disclosure.
G. Substance Abuse
One problem many applicants face is history of substance abuse." The Act
specifically excludes illegal drug users from protection because an "applicant who is
currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs" is not a qualified individual with a
disability.5  But, those who no longer use drugs or are erroneously regarded as using
drugs are protected. 5 s
The Act was intended to exclude illegal drug users-not alcoholics-from pro-
tection. 59 Legislative history supports this conclusion. Passage of the ADA coincided
with President Bush's stepped up war on drugs. Legislators intended that the Act not
undermine the government's commitment to stamping out drugs." °
Id. at 190-91.
155. Id. at 194.
156. Despite absence of supporting data, "[extreme statements regarding the prevalence of problems
with alcohol and other drugs among physicians" persist. Joan M. Brewster, Prevalence of Alcohol and
Other Drug Problems Among Physicians, 255 JAMA 1913 (Apr. 1986). In fact, Dr. Brewster conclud-
ed, "When alcohol and other drugs are considered together, physicians may not be unusually likely to
have such problems." Id.
See also David Orentlicher, Drug Testing of Physicians, 264 JAMA 1039 (Aug. 1990). Dr.
Orentlicher agrees recent, better data contradicts earlier assumptions that physicians are more likely to
abuse drugs than other professionals. However, despite the absence of good data on the correlation
between drug abuse and "substandard patient care, even a small risk cannot be tolerated." Id.
157. 42 U.S.C. § 12114 (1993). Employers may adopt procedures "designed to ensure" that an
individual is no longer using illegal drugs. 42 U.S.C. § 12114(b) (1993).
158. Id.
The Act provides little guidance on how an employer can determine whether an individual uses
illegal drugs. The ADA does distinguish drug testing from prohibited medical examinations. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12114(d)(1) (1993). But, the Act does not "encourage, prohibit, or authorize" drug testing. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12114(d)(2) (1993).
The apparent solution-just ask the applicant-is troubling for at least two reasons. First, be-
cause the drugs are illegal, the applicant would be required to lie--thus risking his career-or tell the
truth-subjecting himself to criminal investigation. This raises obvious Fifth Amendment issues.
At least some boards recognize this problem. The state medical board in New Jersey requires
applicants to respond to all questions. However, relicensing applications explicitly notify licensees of
their right to assert, in writing, their Fifth Amendment privilege in refusing to answer questions about
illegal use of drugs. Jacobs, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14294, at *5.
The second problem is the Act itself. The ADA provides protection for those who are not cur-
rently using illegal drugs-whether they have been rehabilitated or were merely "regarded as engaging
in such use." 42 U.S.C. § 12114(b) (1993). Thus, the Act creates a conundrum: how to identify cur-
rent drug users without impermissibly infringing on the rights of protected individuals. The only situa-
tion where this might not be a problem, of course, is where the behavior of the drug user alerts the
employer to the abuse.
Professional licensing boards face a similar difficulty in identifying current drug users. However,
by focusing on the real issue-whether the applicant's behavior is likely to injure his clients or pa-
tients-the problem is resolved. Boards do not need to know whether an applicant uses illegal drugs.
The only legitimate question is whether the applicant's conduct-whatever its cause-poses a risk to
clients or patients.
159. According to the Act, "homosexuality and bisexuality are not impairments and as such are not
disabilities." 42 U.S.C. § 12211(a) (1993). "Certain conditions" are also excluded. These include vari-
ous "sexual behavior disorders; compulsive gambling, kleptomania, or pyromania; or psychoactive sub-
stance use disorders resulting from current illegal use of drugs." 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b) (1993).
160. Loretta K. Haggard, Reasonable Accommodation of Individuals with Mental Disabilities and
1994] Conduct, Not Mental Illness
However, provisions of the ADA permit employers to treat alcoholics similarly
to drug users, 6' excluding them from protections afforded other individuals with dis-
abilities. For example, the Act provides an employer may hold the employee who "en-
gages in the illegal use of drugs or who is an alcoholic" to the same standards as other
employees. 62 Even though an alcoholic is not specifically excluded from protection,
requiring alcoholics to meet the same standards as other employees appears "to immu-
nize" employers from an obligation to make accommodations for the disability. This
"acts to contradict" an EEOC mandate that alcoholics be treated like other disabled
persons.63
As with mental illness, when evaluating an applicant for a professional license,
the important question' is conduct, not substance abuse-whether illegal drugs or alco-
hol. For example, in a disciplinary action, when the board raised the issue of an
attorney's alcohol abuse, the D.C. court remanded for further inquiry into capacity to
practice."' 4 After violating several disciplinary rules, the attorney was suspended in-
definitely because he was "incapacitated from practicing law by reason of addiction to
alcohol."'65 But, the court remanded because "[n]ot for a moment negat[ing] the im-
portance of the concern ... about respondent's relapses into active drinking and the
effect on his capacity to practice," the record failed to establish the necessary "linkage
of respondent's alcoholism to available specific manifestations of general incapacity to
Psychoactive Substance Use Disorders under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 43 J. UR-
BAN AND CONTEMP. L. 343, 388 (1993).
161. For example, the Act permits a covered entity to ban both alcohol and illegal drugs from the
workplace. 42 U.S.C. § 12114(c)(1) (1993). The Act also allows the covered entity to require employ-
ees not be under the influence of alcohol or illegal drugs at work. 42 U.S.C. § 12114(c)(2) (1993).
162. This is true "even if any unsatisfactory performance or behavior is related to the drug use or
alcoholism." 42 U.S.C. § 12114(c)(4) (1993).
163. Haggard, supra note 160, at 388-89. This author identifies and discusses this conflict created
by the Act. She speculates Congress might simply have intended to only excuse employers from mak-
ing accommodations for substance abusers "under the influence at work." Id. at 388. Unfortunately,
because of the "scanty legislative history" on the issue, courts will have difficulty deciding this issue.
Id. at 388-89.
164. In the Matter of S., 579 A.2d 156 (D.C. 1990).
The same is true when the issue is admission to practice. In re Haukebo, 352 N.W.2d 752
(Minn. 1984) provides an example. Between 1979 and 1981, the applicant had pled guilty to three
charges of driving under the influence of alcohol. In 1982, when he graduated from law school, Craig
Haukebo applied to take the bar exam. Based on its determination that the applicant was dependent on
alcohol-which he consistently denied-the board said he was not "a person of good moral character."
Id. at 755. The Minnesota Supreme Court disagreed, deciding "[a] primary question, then, is whether
chemical dependency on alcohol is rationally related to fitness for the practice of law such that it can
form the basis for preventing an otherwise qualified applicant from gaining admission to the bar." Id.
The court acknowledged alcoholism is a disease, "not a mere pattern of voluntary conduct; neither is it
an offense which necessarily involves moral turpitude or reflects on the individual's honesty, fairness,
or respect for the rights of others or for the law." Id. After conceding alcoholism is "frequently a
contributing factor" in attorney misconduct, the court correctly recognized the test of an applicant's
moral character is his "past and present pattern of conduct or behavior." Id. The court buttressed its
argument with cases from other jurisdictions which "focus on a pattern of immoral conduct and . . .
require that the applicant overcome the presumption that similar conduct will recur in the future." Id.
It is important to recognize, as the court pointed out, Haukebo's behavioral record raised ques-
tions about his moral character. Three convictions for driving while intoxicated reflect "an apparent
disregard" for the law. The board should have "focused on this pattern of behavior as its reason for
questioning Haukebo's moral character," because, the court held, "good moral character for the purpos-
es of bar admission, shall be determined from the applicant's pattern of conduct or behavioral record."
Id. at 756.
165. 579 A.2d at 159 (quoting Board of Professional Responsibility Report).
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practice law."'" In other words, where alcohol abuse is suspected, the "pivotal issue
is how the condition affects the lawyer's ability to function in his or her professional
role."' 67 The "pivotal issue"-ability to function, not substance abuse-is the same
whether raised in a disciplinary action or an application for a license to practice.
H. Using Title I in Title II
Title II specifically prevents public entities from discriminating against qualified
individuals with disabilities when providing benefits. Public entities include "any...
instrumentality of a state."'" This means bar examiners and medical boards, as in-
strumentalities"6 of the State, are public entities prohibited from discriminating.170
Under Title II, a "qualified individual with a disability" is one "who, with or
without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices ... meets the essential
eligibility requirements for. . . participation in programs or activities provided by a
public entity.''. The public entity is only permitted to ask questions about whether
the applicant meets "essential eligibility requirements." Boards bear the burden of
proving what are essential requirements and how specific inquiries measure these qual-
ifications. There is no proof that treatment for mental illness or substance abuse would
prevent an applicant from satisfying essential requirements to practice. Therefore,
boards may not ask questions regarding such treatment.
Title II does not contain detailed protections. Nevertheless, according to ADA
regulations and Interpretive Guidance, Title I provisions are applicable to Title II."
166. Id. at 162.
167. id. at 160.
See also In re Glenville, 565 N.E.2d 623 (Il1. 1990). Michael Glenville was denied admission to
the Illinois Bar based on several incidents of criminal or violent behavior. He claimed his misconduct
only occurred when he was under the influence of alcohol. He testified he had become active in Alco-
holics Anonymous and had not consumed liquor or mood altering drugs in more than six years, fol-
lowing a home invasion armed robbery. He claimed this occurred during a 14 to 16 hour blackout. Id.
at 624-26. Experts testified that excessive alcohol consumption frequently causes blackouts. Id. at 626-
27. A.A. members---who had become friends-and his sister predicted that he would never drink again.
Id. at 626. However, in addition to his prior criminal activity, the court was troubled by inconsisten-
cies in Glenville's story about the robbery and blackout, and lies on his law school application.
The court said applicant was to be "commended for his fortitude" in overcoming his alcoholism.
Nevertheless, rehabilitation is "only one factor, albeit an important one ... past misconduct cannot be
lessened by his subsequent exemplary conduct." Id.
168. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(b) (1993).
169. The U.S. Department of Justice, in its amicus brief in Rosenthal v. New York State Board of
Law Examiners, asserts that "because the board is an 'instrumentality' of the State, it also falls under
the purview of Title H of the act." Rosenthal v. New York State Board of Law Examiners, No. 92-
Civ-II00-JSM (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (quoting DOJ brief)).
170. To avoid any question, the Act specifically waives state immunity as might be claimed under
the Eleventh Amendment. 42 U.S.C. § 12202 (1993).
171. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (1993). This varies slightly from the definition in Title I. See supra
note 105 and accompanying text. Presence of this different definition does not invalidate the argument
that legislators intended some protections from Title I be incorporated into Title II. The minor modifi-
cations merely reflect differences between employment and public programs or activities. Substantively,
the protection is the same. Neither the employer nor covered entity may discriminate against a disabled
individual who meets essential qualifications, with or without accommodations or modifications.
172. The only limitation is that they be consistent with Section 504 Rehabilitation Act. 28 C.F.R.
§ 35.103(a). See Judiciary Committee Report, H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 84
(1990).
The State Medical Board in New Jersey agrees that Title I should be incorporated into Title II.
Jacobs, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14294 (D.N.J. Oct. 5, 1993). The Board uses this conclusion to sup-
port questions regarding mental illness and substance abuse on its relicensure application. Conceding
1994] Conduct, Not Mental Illness
Some commentators suggest that Title I provisions only apply to Title II when the
State is an employer."" They are wrong-at least to the extent this theory denies Ti-
tle I protections to applicants for professional licenses.
First, neither the Act nor regulations contain this restriction. Second, the purpose
of the Act is to prevent discrimination against disabled individuals. Discrimination in
employment may seem particularly harmful, but legislative history and testimony be-
fore Congressional committees establish the pervasiveness and virulence of discrimina-
tion against persons with disabilities. The ADA was enacted to combat this discrimina-
tion, whatever its source. Thus, legislators must have intended that the specific
protections provided in Title I apply to the less detailed provisions of Title II to satisfy
the broad purpose of the Act to prevent discrimination against disabled individuals.
Indeed, a third reason to apply Title I provisions to Title II is provided by an
explicit statement in Title II regulations evidencing intent to extend broad protection to
disabled persons.'74 Finally, even if legislators did not intend to extend provisions of
Title I to all services and benefits under Title II-because they are not appropriate or
necessary-the protections should be applied to professional licensing. A board's Ii-
the Act specifically prohibits pre-employment questions about disabilities, the Board argues its relicens-
ing procedure complies with the Act.
Medical questions and examinations about disability-prohibited pre-employment-are permissible
after a conditional offer. The offer may be withdrawn based on the information obtained from these
medical examinations only if the reason is job related and consistent with business necessity. Because
the Board grants renewal licenses to all licensees who complete the application-whatever their answers
to these questions-the Board claims its relicensure procedure is analogous to post-employment inqui-
ries. The Board argues that because the Act permits an employer to withdraw an offer based on medi-
cal information, it also allows Boards to use responses to trigger further investigation into an
applicant's fitness to practice medicine.
This argument rests on the notion that obtaining a professional license is comparable to being
hired for a job. Medical inquiries and examinations after the applicant is granted a license are analo-
gous to post-employment inquiries-approved by the ADA under limited circumstances. On a motion
for preliminary injunction, the court rejected this argument. Ironically, however, the theory-if accept-
ed-would invalidate the same questions on initial applications. If the initial license is similar to em-
ployment-and the Board concedes questions about mental illness and substance abuse cannot be asked
until after employment-the Board must agree that these inquiries are improper on initial applications.
173. See, e.g., Charles Reischel, supra note 36, at 18-19. Reischel concedes that legislative history
suggests "'forms' of discrimination prohibited by, inter alia, Title I should also be prohibited by Title
U." Id. at 19. But, he claims, "such intended incorporation seems to be limited to government activi-'
ties which .. .fit into the employment ... context ...." Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 485(11), 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. 84 (1990) (Committee on Education and Labor).
Reischel concludes that "[b]ar admission certification does not 'fit into ... the employ-
ment ...context."' Id. Based on a "continuing relationship," the employer will have a greater means
and incentive to test applicants and will "derive benefits or suffer detriments" due to the worker's
performance. Reischel contrasts this with the licensing board which "deals with many applicants, al-
ways on a strictly limited basis, . . . not directly affected, if at all, by their post-license performance."
id. He reaches his erroneous conclusion because he perceives these differences but ignores fundamental
similarities.
Superficially correct, his argument misses the true nature of the licensing process. Professional
licensing boards take their ongoing responsibilities to the public seriously. Although the initial licensing
decision is "limited," once admitted, the applicant has a continuing relationship with other professionals
and his post-license performance affects them, at least indirectly. Furthermore, in some jurisdictions,
boards have continuing responsibility for recertification.
Most importantly, however, Reischel ignores the underlying basic similarity with the employment
situation-the applicant who is not granted a license cannot work in his chosen profession. See infra
notes 176-80 and accompanying text.
174. "This part does not invalidate or limit the remedies, rights, and procedures of any other Fed-
eral laws . . .. that provide greater or equal protection for the rights of individuals with disabili-
ties . . . .' 28 C.F.R. § 35.103(b) (1993).
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censing function bears greater similarities to an employer-employee situation than to
other services and benefits covered under Title II. Unless admitted to the bar, a
law school graduate cannot work as an attorney. Unless granted a license, a medical
school graduate cannot practice as a physician. Licensing is merely one step removed
from employment and is an essential condition to practice.
A 1992 ADA case provides further support for the conclusion that Title I
protections apply to licensing even though it is not an employment situation. 7 The
plaintiff claimed he was denied vocational rehabilitation because of his refusal to sub-
mit to a psychological examination." He argued that requiring an examination vio-
lated the Title I prohibition on medical examinations. "[I]t is arguable that what is con-
sidered discrimination in employment practices (Subchapter I) may well be considered
discrimination by entities providing services (Subchapter 11).""" The court rejected
the notion that the claim was frivolous simply because plaintiff "was seeking vocation-
al rehabilitation rather than actually applying for a job."'7 In the same way, courts
should reject a claim that the ADA does not apply merely because the applicant is
seeking a license "rather than actually applying for a job."
VI. SUMMARY
In an effort to protect clients, patients, and the public, professional licensing
boards inquire into character and fitness to practice. Boards ask applicants questions
about history of or treatment for mental illness and substance abuse in their effort to
determine fitness. Nonetheless, these questions are inappropriate, and their very asking
constitutes injury to all applicants.
Recent scientific data concerning mental illness and substance abuse cast doubt
on the utility of these inquiries as part of the fitness evaluation. Relying on conclusions
supported by outdated research, courts have upheld the use of these questions. Never-
theless, new data supports a reweighing in the balancing test between an applicant's
privacy rights and protection of the public. Even if courts continue to reject constitu-
tional challenges, however, these questions must be eliminated from professional li-
censing applications because they violate the ADA.
The Act protects people who are or have been disabled and those who are "re-
garded as having a disability." By asking the questions, boards imply they regard ap-
plicants with history of or treatment for mental illness and substance abuse as "having
a disability." As a result of this implication, these applicants are entitled to protection
of the ADA, and any inquiries must comply with the Act's requirement that questions
be connected with "essential business functions" of a physician or attorney. No proof
ties information derived from questions about mental illness and substance abuse to
175. Many of the specific provisions under Title I are not necessary for certain services and bene-
fits provided under Title II. Chai Feldblum, Medical Examinations and Inquiries Under The Americans
With Disabilities Act: A View From The Inside, 64 TEMP. L.Q. 521 (1991). For example, many Title I
protections are simply not relevant to disabled persons using parks and public buildings. Disabled
individuals do need these protections when applying for licensing because this "benefit" is more close-
ly analogous to an employer-employee situation than a picnic in the park.
176. Kent v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Elementary and Secondary Education and Div. of Voca-
tional Rehabilitation, 792 F. Supp. 59 (E.D. Mo. 1992).
177. Id. at 60. He refused because he claimed that psychological examinations violate his religious
beliefs. Id.
178. Id. at 61.
179. Id.
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professional functions performed by doctors or lawyers. Thus, these questions must be
eliminated from applications. Because present inquiries violate the ADA, information
obtained cannot be used.
The best means to predict an applicant's behavior and fitness to practice is past
conduct. If boards are truly interested in fitness to practice medicine or law, new ques-
tions should inquire into past behavior.
VII. SUGGESTED QUESTIONS
1. Have you ever been expelled, suspended from, or had disciplinary action taken
against you by any educational institution? If so, explain the circumstances.
2. Has your grade point average ever varied by half a letter grade or more be-
tween two terms? If so, explain the circumstances.
3. Have you ever been absent from school or a job for more than 30 consecutive
days? If so, explain the circumstances.
4. Have you ever been fired from, asked to leave, or had disciplinary action
taken against you in any job? If so, explain the circumstances.
5. Have you ever been evicted or asked to vacate a place in which you lived? If
so, explain the circumstances.
6. Have you ever been arrested for D.U.I.? If so, explain the circumstances,
including the outcome of the incident."
7. Have you had any blackouts or periods of intoxication associated with alcohol
or any other drug within the past six months? If so, explain the circumstances.
180. Although apparently contradictory to the American legal system, asking about arrests and
outcome in addition to convictions is important to decide whether an individual is impaired. For exam-
ple, regardless of whether he was convicted, the Board would have reason for concern if an applicant
had been arrested several times for driving under the influence and each time he had been above the
legal limit for intoxication.
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